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Current information security systems rely heavily on symmetric key cryptographic primitives
as one of their basic building blocks. In order to boost the efficiency of the security systems, designers
of the underlying primitives often tend to avoid the use of provably secure designs. In fact, they adopt
ad hoc designs with claimed security assumptions in the hope that they resist known cryptanalytic
attacks. Accordingly, the security evaluation of such primitives continually remains an open field. In
this thesis, we analyze the security of two cryptographic hash functions and one block cipher. We
primarily focus on the recent AES-based designs used in the new Russian Federation cryptographic
hashing and encryption suite GOST because the majority of our work was carried out during the open
research competition run by the Russian standardization body TC26 for the analysis of their new
cryptographic hash function Streebog. Although, there exist security proofs for the resistance of AES-
based primitives against standard differential and linear attacks, other cryptanalytic techniques such as
integral, rebound, and meet-in-the-middle attacks have proven to be effective. The results presented in
this thesis can be summarized as follows:
Initially, we analyze various security aspects of the Russian cryptographic hash function GOST
R 34.11-2012, also known as Streebog or Stribog. In particular, our work investigates five security
aspects of Streebog. Firstly, we present a collision analysis of the compression function and its in-
ternal cipher in the form of a series of modified rebound attacks. Secondly, we propose an integral
distinguisher for the 7- and 8-round compression function. Thirdly, we investigate the one wayness
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of Streebog with respect to two approaches of the meet-in-the-middle attack, where we present a
preimage analysis of the compression function and combine the results with a multicollision attack
to generate a preimage of the hash function output. Fourthly, we investigate Streebog in the context
of malicious hashing and by utilizing a carefully tailored differential path, we present a backdoored
version of the hash function where collisions can be generated with practical complexity. Lastly, we
propose a fault analysis attack which retrieves the inputs of the compression function and utilize it to
recover the secret key when Streebog is used in the keyed simple prefix and secret-IV MACs, HMAC,
or NMAC. All the presented results are on reduced round variants of the function except for our analy-
sis of the malicious version of Streebog and our fault analysis attack where both attacks cover the full
round hash function.
Next, we examine the preimage resistance of the AES-based Maelstrom-0 hash function which is
designed to be a lightweight alternative to the ISO standardized hash function Whirlpool. One of the
distinguishing features of the Maelstrom-0 design is the proposal of a new chaining construction called
3CM which is based on the 3C/3C+ family. In our analysis, we employ a 4-stage approach that uses
a modified technique to defeat the 3CM chaining construction and generates preimages of the 6-round
reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function.
Finally, we provide a key recovery attack on the new Russian encryption standard GOST R 34.12-
2015, also known as Kuznyechik. Although Kuznyechik adopts an AES-based design, it exhibits a
faster diffusion rate as it employs an optimal diffusion transformation. In our analysis, we propose
a meet-in-the-middle attack using the idea of efficient differential enumeration where we construct
a three round distinguisher and consequently are able to recover 16-bytes of the master key of the
reduced 5-round cipher. We also present partial sequence matching, by which we generate, store, and
match parts of the compared parameters while maintaining negligible probability of matching error,
thus the overall online time complexity of the attack is reduced.
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1.1 General Overview and Motivation
Ever since ancient times, cryptography has been used to protect the privacy of governmental and
military communications. With the development of telecommunications during the twentieth century,
cryptography has become more important as it evolved to ensure not only information confidentiality,
but also its integrity and authenticity. A cryptosystem is usually described by an algorithm that states
the series of operations to be performed on the message. Historically, such operations were applied on
messages by hand or with the aid of mechanical machines such as the German Enigma [110]. Also,
the concept of security by obscurity where the whole cryptographic algorithm is kept a secret was
widely adopted. Currently, computers are integral components of the modern networked IT society.
Cryptographic primitives are implemented in small processors used by almost every digital object such
as mobile phones and credit cards. Accordingly, hiding the workings of the adopted cryptographic
algorithms cannot scale with such wide deployment of the utilized security systems. In fact, modern
cryptography follows the principle of Auguste Kerckhoffs [81] which states that cryptographic systems
must use openly described algorithms while hiding only little information. Such secret information is
referred to as a key that is known to the intended parties involved in the communication. Thus, if
such key is compromised, setting a new key is enough to regain the system security without the need
to change the whole cryptosystem. Additionally and more importantly, it enables the continually
ongoing public analysis of the cryptosystem which strengthens the confidence of the cryptographic
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community in its security.
Academic research in cryptography revolves around two high level research directions which are
the proposal of new cryptosystems and the cryptanalysis of such systems. Designers of modern cryp-
tosystems often opt for non provably secure designs as they are more efficient in terms of their running
time, hardware area, and power consumption. Alternatively, the designers of such systems specify the
assumed expected effort and resources required to violate the security requirements of their cryptosys-
tems. Such effort and resources rely on the cryptosystem parameters which are chosen such that the
effort and resources required by the respective generic attacks are infeasible to be realized practically.
On the other hand, cryptanalysts study the workings of such systems and try to devise new approaches
to attack their security properties. An attack on a given cryptosystem is considered successful when
any of its security properties can be violated with an effort and resources less than those specified by
its designers [110].
Symmetric-key cryptosystems are cryptographic primitives that employ one cryptographic key for
both the encryption and decryption procedures [110]. Such primitives include block and stream ci-
phers, Message Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, and dedicated authenticated encryption algo-
rithms. Hash functions are publicly computable deterministic unkeyed functions. However, they are
commonly included in the category of symmetric-key primitives due to the fact that they are often built
on a block cipher core and cryptanalyzed using block cipher approaches. One of the most prominent
block ciphers is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [45] as it is the U.S. standardized encryption
algorithm and is widely deployed in security protocols. The AES design offers a heuristic proof for the
lower bound complexities against standard differential and linear attacks [28, 100]. Additionally, ever
since its inception, no attacks have been discovered that compromise its security in practice. For that
reason, many proposals of other symmetric-key primitives such as hash functions and authenticated
encryption schemes are adopting AES-based designs.
Generally, symmetric-key encryption algorithms that are built using rigorous security proofs
may not be suitable in terms of running time for the current demands and constraints of modern security
systems. For that reason, most of the practically used and standardized cryptographic primitives gain
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their strength from withstanding years of cryptanalysis without being broken. In other words, such
algorithms do not provide a proof of absolute security, but because they have been studied for several
years by cryptanalysts, the confidence in their resistance to various attacks is strengthened. Such
demand for analysis is usually motivated by the significance of the cryptographic primitive and/or its
participation in public research competitions. During such competitions, the standardization body calls
for submissions for a cryptographic primitive or analysis results on a given primitive. In response to
such call, designers from the cryptographic community submit their proposals or research papers that
are evaluated by other researchers through multiple analysis rounds until a winner is chosen. Examples
of such competitions include the U.S. NIST’s block cipher standard AES (1997-2000) [117] and hash
function standard Secure Hash Algorithm-3 (SHA-3) (2007-2012) [118] competitions, and the Russian
TC26 open research competition for the analysis of the standard hash function Streebog (2013-2015)
[138]. Additionally, a new Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and
Robustness (CAESAR) [41] funded by NIST was initiated in 2013 to select a portfolio of authenticated
encryption algorithms, where the winning schemes are expected to be announced in 2017. These
competitions have lead to a flurry in both the design and cryptanalysis of cryptographic algorithms.
Particularly, the Russian open research competition on Streebog has motivated the majority of our
work which aims to propose cryptanalytic attacks on the Russian cryptographic hashing standard to
provide better lower bounds on its security margins.
Cryptanalysis starting from the mid-2000s has improved significantly, especially in the area related
to hash functions. More precisely, it has been shown that the commonly used hash functions by that
time offered only a very limited security margin. In particular, a completely new chapter in the his-
tory of the analysis of Merkle-Damga˚rd (MD) construction that adopt Add-Rotate-Xor (ARX)-based
designs was opened when Wang et al. [143, 144] managed to enhance multi-block differential crypt-
analysis to a point that finding collisions for MD5 became utterly feasible (under a minute on a PC)
and a vast reduction of the security margin was obtained for Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1). Al-
though Wang’s random looking collisions by themselves do not pose any harm, later it was shown that
inserting these blocks in certain places of popular documents format (such as PostScript or MS word)
can lead to two different files that hash to the same value. Another elegant yet severe consequence
3
of this attack was demonstrated in [137] through the construction of two different X.509 certificates
with two different public keys and the same MD5 hash. Such attack allows impersonation and defeats
directly the authentication mechanism of security protocols using MD5. In response to these dramatic
cryptanalytic attacks, the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) decided to develop
another hash function through a public competition [118]. The SHA-3 competition ended in Octo-
ber 2012 with Keccak [69] being announced as the new U.S. cryptographic hashing standard [40].
During this competition, there has been a conceptual shift in hash function designs through the pro-
posal of several AES-based hash functions. Indeed, at the same time when most of the standardized
ARX-based hash functions were failing to resist the techniques introduced by Wang et al., the already
existing ISO standard AES-based Whirlpool [126] was not affected by these attacks. The inclination
towards AES-based hash function designs was clearly evident among the SHA-3 competition propos-
als (e.g., the SHA-3 finalists Grøstl [60], JH [149], and LANE [73]). Additionally, Streebog [102],
the new Russian hash standard which is officially known as GOST R 34.11-2012, is also among the
recently proposed AES-based hash functions. Streebog has been proposed by a group of Russian
designers [102], and chosen by the Russian standardization body TC26 to be the new cryptographic
hashing encryption standard. In order to boost the confidence of the cryptographic community in
Streebog, TC26 has called for an international open research competition dedicated to the analysis of
its new standard. The work presented in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis has been chosen by
TC26 as a winner of the open research competition dedicated for the analysis of Streebog.
AES adopts the wide trail design strategy [45] which is a design approach that mitigates standard
differential and linear attacks. This strategy provides upper bounds for the probability of any differ-
ential or linear trail. More precisely, the wide trail strategy ensures that full difference diffusion after
two rounds such that no sparse differential path can be constructed. In the case of AES, the mini-
mum number of active Sboxes of any 4-round path is 25. All the attacks on the AES block cipher
in the secret key setting have time, memory, or data complexities that makes such attacks far from
being realized practically, and consequently, they do not directly threaten the security of AES. Such
attacks include boomerang related-key attack [30], biclique attacks [32], and meet-in-the-middle at-
tacks [48, 49, 52, 96]. Accordingly, the new Russian encryption standard Kuznyechik [3] is designed
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based on the wide trail strategy. However, unlike AES, Kuznyechik employs a full state optimum diffu-
sion transformation which ensures full diffusion after one encryption round and results in a minimum
of 17 active Sboxes in any 2-round path.
Today, almost every electronic transaction with security requirements relies on the underlying en-
cryption and cryptographic hashing primitives. The research scope of this thesis lies in the analysis
of standardized and/or significant AES-based cryptographic primitives, which is important work since
compromising their security results in the direct compromise of the security of the whole system em-
ploying them. Finding and exhibiting weaknesses of such cryptographic primitives allows fixing them
which foils adversaries and prevents any attempt to compromise systems of critical importance such as
the IT infrastructure of government organizations and banks which are probably going to adopt such
standardized primitives.
The cryptanalytic results presented in this thesis are motivated by the need to devise cryptanalytic
methods to analyze the security of AES-based cryptographic primitives in order to provide better lower
bounds of their security margins. The main goal of this thesis is to enhance the state of knowledge of
the cryptographic and security communities regarding the real security of the analyzed primitives.
1.2 Thesis contributions
In this thesis, we investigate five security properties of the Russian cryptographic hash function
Streebog. We also study the resistance of the Maelstrom-0 hash function to preimage attacks. Finally,
we propose a key recovery attack on the Russian encryption standard Kuznyechik. The contributions
of this thesis are as follows:
- We analyze the collision resistance of the Streebog compression function and its internal ci-
pher with respect to rebound attacks and present practical collision examples on reduced round
version of the function to verify our results.
- We study the structural integral properties of reduced-round versions of the Streebog compres-
sion function and its internal permutation, where we present 7 and 8-round distinguishers for the
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compression function.
- We investigate the security of Streebog and its compression function, assessing their resistance
to the meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks, and present a pseudo preimage attack on the com-
pression function and use it to produce hash function preimages.
- We propose a malicious version of Streebog where we exploit the randomness of the independent
round constants to provide a backdoored version of the hash function where collisions can be
feasibly generated. Our proposed attack has a practical complexity and is verified by example.
- We present a differential fault analysis attack on Streebog, where we consider the function when
used in the secret key setting. We propose a two-stage attack to recover the secret inputs of the
function when it is used in various MAC schemes.
- We investigate the security of Maelstrom-0 and its compression function, assessing their re-
sistance to the meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks, and propose a four stage approach which
combines a 2-block multicollision attack [56,57] with a meet-in-the-middle attack to bypass the
effect of its finalization step and generate preimages of the reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function.
- We propose a key recovery meet-in-the-middle attack on the Russian encryption standard, Kuznyechik,
using efficient differential enumeration [49]. We also present partial sequence matching which
enables us to lower the overall time complexity of the attack and reduce its memory require-
ments.
The above contributions have been published in [7, 11, 12, 14–17]. Other works conducted during the




In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the two basic classes of cryptosystems. We also
present a high level literature survey on the different design approaches for symmetric-key encryption
algorithms and hash functions, and the well known cryptanalytic methods used for their analysis.
2.1 The Role of Cryptography
A cryptosystem is a system that provides essential security properties required by communi-
cation entities. For example, as depicted in Figure 2.1, if two users, Alice and Bob are exchanging
messages remotely, the assurance that the exchanged messages are not disclosed, modified, or fabri-
cated is not guaranteed. Moreover, if they are communicating wirelessly, it becomes utterly easy for
adversaries to either intercept and read their messages passively, or actively engage in the communi-
cation by modifying, deleting, or inserting messages.
Cryptography provides a framework of various cryptographic algorithms to ensure essential security
requirements for the safe communication between Alice and Bob. Such requirements include [110]:
- Confidentiality: Keeping information secret from all but those who are authorized to see it.
- Integrity: Ensuring information has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means.
- Entity authentication: Corroboration of the identity of an entity.
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Figure 2.1: An insecure unencrypted communication channel
- Non repudiation: Preventing the denial of previous commitments or actions.
From a high level perspective, cryptosystems are divided into two different design classes: symmetric-
key and asymmetric-key primitives. They both differ in the roles of both Alice and Bob, employed
operations, rate of data throughput, and key management. In what follows, we give a brief overview
of these two classes of cryptographic algorithms
2.1.1 Symmetric-key Primitives
Symmetric-key primitives are also known as private key algorithms, and only one key is re-
quired in a communication session. LetEnc(m;K) andDec(m;K) denote encrypting and decrypting
message m with key K, respectively. As depicted in Figure 2.2, both Alice and Bob have symmetric
roles as they share a secret keyK which is used to encrypt and decrypt the exchanged information. As
long as the secret key is known only to Alice and Bob, an adversary cannot disclose the contents of
their encrypted communication. Symmetric-key primitives often adopt rather simple operations (e.g.,
xor, shift, and table lookups), thus they are characterized by their high data throughput and suitability
to resource constrained environments. However, they suffer from the key distribution problem where it
requires an additional mechanism to allow Alice and bob to exchange the private key securely. Cryp-
tosystems that employ symmetric-key cryptography include block ciphers, stream ciphers, Message
Authentication Code (MAC) schemes, and authenticated encryption algorithms.
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Figure 2.2: Alice and Bob using symmetric-key encryption
2.1.2 Asymmetric-key Primitives
Asymmetric-key primitives are also known as public-key algorithms as the key material in-
cludes both private and public information. More precisely, as depicted in Figure 2.3, in a given
communication session, each participant has two different keys called a key pair (Kprv; Kpub): a pri-
vate and a public key. Bob’s public key Kbpub is used by Alice to encrypt messages that only he can
decrypt using his private key Kbprv. For that, a given entity’s public key can be advertised publicly
and used by anyone to initiate secure communication with it, as only the owner of the corresponding
private key can disclose the contents of the communication. Because of the fact that the information
required for encryption is public, asymmetric-key cryptosystems do not have a problem in managing
key distribution. In fact, public-key cryptosystems are often used to enable the distribution of secret
session keys in communications protected using symmetric-key encryption. On the other hand, public-
key primitives are several orders of magnitude slower than symmetric-key algorithms and their keys
are considerably long (e.g., 1024-2048 bit). Cryptosystems that employ asymmetric-key cryptogra-
phy include digital signatures such as DSS [82], public-key encryption such as RSA [77], and key
agreement protocols such as the Diffie-Hellman protocol [125].
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Figure 2.3: Alice and Bob using asymmetric-key encryption
2.2 Block Ciphers
A block cipher is a bijective function that maps a block of n bits of the plaintext into a block
of n bits ciphertext parametrized by a secret key of k bits. Let Enc(p;K) and Dec(c;K) denote the
encryption and decryption of the n-bit plaintext and ciphertext blocks using a k-bit key, respectively.
Formally, a block cipher encompasses the following two mappings [110]:
Enc(p;K) : f0; 1gn  f0; 1gk 7! f0; 1gn
Dec(c;K) : f0; 1gn  f0; 1gk 7! f0; 1gn
such that for a given key K, p = Dec(Enc(p;K); K) where the key K is chosen at random from the
k-bit key space. A block cipher algorithm defines encryption, decryption, and round subkey generation
procedures. Initially, the secret key is processed through a number of mixed linear and nonlinear trans-
formations to generate a set of subkeys to be used in both the encryption and decryption procedures. In
the encryption process, the plaintext is used to initialize the encryption state which changes continually
by being processed through iterating a nonlinear function for a specific number of rounds [134]. In
each round, a given secret subkey is mixed with the current state to progressively obscure its contents.
Block ciphers usually employ rather simple operations in their round function which by themselves
are insufficient to deliver the required security properties, However, cascading them in a given order
in the round function and iterating such function for enough number of rounds makes the algorithm
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resistant to known attacks. A round function typically consists of linear and nonlinear transformations.
The linear transformations are often implemented using xores, cyclic shifts, and finite field multipli-
cations by constants. On the other hand, nonlinear transformations can be designed using Sboxes, and
modular additions.
Modern block ciphers adopt one of two design architectures: Fiestel Network or Substitution Per-
mutation Network (SPN) which are both depicted in Figure 2.4. The former approach which is adopted
by the past encryption standard, DES [116] requires more rounds of iterating the mixing round func-
tion than the SPN structure to achieve full diffusion of the secret key bits. This is due to the fact that
the round function is applied only to half the encryption state and consequently, half the new updated
state remains unprocessed. At first the plaintext is loaded in the encryption state (L0; R0), for n=2-bit
blocks L0 and R0. After being processed for r rounds the state contains the ciphertext (Rr; Lr). For
1  i  r, round i transforms state (Li 1; Ri 1) to state (Li; Ri) as follows:
Li = Ri 1;
Ri = Li 1  f(Ri 1; Ki);
where Ki denotes the generated subkey for round i and f is the mixing function. On the other hand,
as shown in Figure 2.4, in the SPN structure, the round mixing function is applied to the whole state
which is initially loaded by the plaintext. Each round applies a key mixing transformation followed
by a substitution and permutation/linear transformation. All the employed transformations must be
invertible in order to enable decryption of the generated ciphertext. On the other hand, the mixing
function f in Fiestel designs may not be invertible because decryption is achieved by running the same
r-round encryption procedure on the ciphertext and using the subkeys in the reverse order.
2.2.1 Security Requirements
It is required that block ciphers resist attacks where the adversary can have additional knowl-
edge and capabilities than only observing random ciphertext. This extra knowledge results in the
adversary mounting known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, chosen-ciphertext, and adaptive attacks [110].
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Figure 2.4: Fiestel and Substitution Permutation Network constructions.
Also, recently, there has been an inclination from the cryptographic community to consider
the resistance of block cipher to additional attack scenarios. For example, current block ciphers are
analyzed with respect to related-key attacks [30] in which the adversary is assumed to adopt a chosen-
plaintext model while assuming that encryption is performed using different unknown keys that have
a known/chosen difference. Also, analysis of block ciphers using the known-key and chosen-key [90]
models has become popular due to the utilization of block ciphers in constructing hash functions.
Particularly, when a block cipher-based compression function is used in a hash function, both inputs to
of the internal block ciphers are known. More precisely, according to the adopted mode of operation,
either the message or the chaining value is processed through the key generation procedure, and thus
the attacker can control the key input. Since all the analyzed primitives in this thesis adopt an AES-
based design, in what follows, we give a brief description of the AES block cipher.
2.2.2 The Advanced Encryption Standard
AES is the U.S. standardized block cipher [117] which was originally proposed by Daemen
and Rijmen [45]. AES is an SPN cipher that follows the wide trail strategy which ensures that the
full diffusion of a difference in one byte is achieved after two execution rounds. The algorithm defines
encryption and key schedule procedures. In what follows, we give a brief overview of the specifications
of AES.
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- Encryption: AES encrypts blocks of 128 bits which are initially loaded in a state of 4  4 bytes.
It allows the use of three key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits where the encryption procedure updates
the state for 10, 12, and 14 rounds, respectively. As depicted in Figure 2.5, during one round, the
following four round transformations are used to update the state:
- SubBytes (SB): A nonlinear transformation that substitutes each byte from the state by another
byte from the AES Sbox.
- ShiftRows (SR): A linear cyclic shift transformation that rotates the ith row of the state to the left
by i places, for i = 0; 1; 2; and 3.
- MixColumns (MC): A linear transformation that left multiplies a constant MDS matrix [45] by
the state. Each column of the state is multiplied independently.
- AddKey (AK): A linear transformation which es the 16-byte subkey with the state.
Initially, the plaintext block is loaded in the state and then it is ed with the secret master key before the
beginning of the first round. Also, the MixColumns transformation is omitted in the last round.
Figure 2.5: The AES round function.
- Subkeys Generation: Round subkeys are 128-bit keys where the ith round subkeyKi is generated
from its preceding round subkey Ki 1, and the initial key K0 is evaluated from the master key. One
round of the subkey generation procedure consists of a linear part using operations and circular shifts
and a nonlinear part using four AES Sbox lookups. More details of the exact working of the AES key
schedule can be found in [45].
- Decryption: AES is an SPN construction where all its transformations are invertible. Accordingly,
the AES decryption is implemented by applying the inverse round transformations in reverse order on
the ciphertext using the round keys that are applied in the reverse order.
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2.3 Hash Functions
A hash function is a function that maps arbitrary strings into strings of fixed length. It takes a
message as an input and computes a fingerprint for this message (sometimes called the message digest).
The message is seen as a sequence of bits of arbitrary length, and the fingerprint is a sequence of bits of
a fixed size, for example 256 bits (the output size of the hash function). The hash function compresses
the message, and generates a fingerprint that depends on all the bits of the message. Accordingly,
it can be used to uniquely identify and guarantee the integrity of this message. In what follows, we
define the fundamental properties of hash functions. Moreover, we discuss different applications of
hash functions, and describe their basic design principles.
2.3.1 Cryptographic Properties and Applications
A perfect hash function should behave like a random oracle [36]. The only way to get informa-
tion about the fingerprint of a message is to recalculate it, and the result must be random and exhibit
great avalanche effect. The most important properties that are related to the use of a hash function to
produce unique identifiers are: preimage resistance, second preimage resistance, and collision resis-
tance [110]. Let H be a hash function with n-bit output, i.e., H is a deterministic function that takes
an arbitrary length input, and outputs a binary string of length n. Formally, H : f0; 1g 7! f0; 1gn.
Definition 2.1 A hash function H is preimage resistant (one-way) if for essentially all pre-specified
outputs, it is computationally infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., to find any
preimage x such that H(x) = y when given any y for which a corresponding input is not known.
Definition 2.2 A hash function H is second-preimage resistant (weak collision resistant) if it is com-
putationally infeasible to find any second input which has the same output as any specified input, i.e.,
given x, to find a 2nd-preimage y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y).
Definition 2.3 A hash functionH is collision resistant (strong collision resistant) if it is computation-
ally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x and y which hash to the same output, i.e.,H(x) = H(y)
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Collision resistance implies second-preimage resistance but not vice versa. In practice, collision re-
sistance is the most difficult to satisfy because generating a random colliding message pair is less
restrictive than finding a second preimage or a preimage of a given digest. Consequently, breaking
collision resistance is the main objective of most of the attacks on hash functions. However, a good
hash function should exhibit other properties than that mentioned above. For example, one would ex-
pect that flipping an input bit would lead to approximately half the output bits being flipped (avalanche
property) and that one cannot practically guess some input bits when given the output of the hash
function (local one-wayness). Inability to provide such properties or other properties, such as the re-
sistance to pseudo-collision [142] (also known as free-start collision) where one can find two different
messages and two different chaining values that hash to the same digest, semi free-start collision where
one can find two different messages and two equal chaining values which are not equal to the standard
IV that hash to the same digest, and second order collision attacks is categorized as a certificational
weakness. These weak properties do not imply a break of a hash function but are enough to shed doubt
on its design principles.
The hash function is a very versatile cryptographic primitive, and many cryptographic systems are
based on it, that is why it has gained a reputation for being the swiss army knife of cryptography. Ap-
plications that employ hash functions in the core of their operation include:
- Digital signatures (Hash-and-Sign): Signature schemes such as RSA or ElGamal [110] are
used to authenticate the message and the signer, but they require complex calculations. Generally,
instead of applying a signature scheme directly to a long message, the signature is applied to a hash of
the message. Thus, the signing operation is performed on a small identifier and consequently is less
expensive.
- Commitment schemes: E-bidding and digital cash protocols [67, 146] demand that partici-
pants commit to their decisions. Firstly, a participant reveals the hash of her randomized decision, then
later reveals its contents. The hash provides no usable information about the decision, but it ensures
that the participant cannot change it after revealing the hash.
- Message Authentication Code (MAC): To authenticate a messageM , two participants share
a secret key K, and add an identifierMACK(M) to the message. An adversary should not be able to
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calculate theMAC without knowing the key. A simple way to construct a MAC is to get the message
and the key in a hash function (e.g., HMACK(M) = H(K  opad k H(K  ipad kM))) [25].
2.3.2 Generic Attacks
A generic attack is an attack that is applicable to all hash functions irrespective of their internal
structure, as opposed to certain attacks that exploit specific vulnerabilities of a particular design. The
complexity of a generic attacks is evaluated by the number of the hash function evaluations needed to
mount this attack. The generic complexities of preimage, second preimage, and collision attacks for a
hash function H with n bit output are provided below [110].
- Pre-image attack: In this attack, the adversary is given a hash, and she must find a message
that produces this hash. The generic attack is the exhaustive search, which has a complexity of 2n.
- Second preimage attack: The adversary is provided with a message, and she must find
another message that has the same hash value. This attack is generally easier than preimage attack,
because one can reuse parts of the first message to figure out the second. However, the generic attack
is still the exhaustive search, which requires 2n hash computations.
- Collision attack: In this attack, the adversary has to find two messages with the same hash.
A collision attack is easier to launch than preimage and second preimage attacks because the opponent
has the choice of two messages. The generic attack is based on the birthday paradox [110], which has
a complexity of 2n=2. Table. 2.1 provides the parameters of the three generic attacks. In what follows,
we recall the birthday paradox and its relation to collision search.
The birthday paradox [110] is a mathematical property, which states that the probability of finding
two people among a random group of 1:2
p
365 = 23 people that share the same birthday is about 50
percent [110]. The same rationale applies to finding a pair of messages that collides under a random





Attack Input Output Property Complexity
Pre-image H(M1) M2 H(M1) = H(M2) 2n
2nd preimage M1 M2 H(M1) = H(M2),M1 6=M2 2n
Collision - M1;M2 H(M1) = H(M2) 2n=2
Table 2.1: Generic attack parameters.
2.3.3 Hash Function Construction
Rather than building directly a function that compresses an arbitrary input size, cryptographic
hash functions are constructed from iterating the execution of a compression function. A compression
function takes a fixed size input and compresses it to a fixed size output. However, a hash function
must be able to process arbitrary size input. Consequently, it needs a domain extender to extend
the domain of the compression function. Thus, given a compression function, the domain extender
produces a function with arbitrary-length input. In what follows, we give a brief overview on the
Merkle-Damga˚rd domain extender which is the most widely used domain extender.
Merkle-Damga˚rd (MD) Construction
As depicted in Figure 2.6, the easiest way to build a hash function is to iterate over the compres-
sion function and use the last calculated output as the hash value. In 1989, RalphMerkle [111] and Ivan
Damga˚rd [46] independently proposed a domain extender algorithm and proved that if the one-way
compression function is collision resistant, then the hash function constructed using it is also collision
resistant. However, the MD construction is vulnerable to the length extension attack where given an
unknown hash function input x and its digest H(x), it is easy to find the value of H(xjjpad(x)jjy),
where y is a message chosen by the attacker and pad is the padding function of the hash function
which is used to make the length of the input message a multiple of the message block length. Other
domain extenders build on the MD construction and propose a finalization stage to mitigate the length
extension attack. Such finalization stage usually applies the compression function on the summation
of either the intermediate chaining values [61] or the messages [102].
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Figure 2.6: Merkle-Damga˚rd construction
2.3.4 Block Cipher-based Compression Functions
The most common method for constructing a compression function is to employ a block cipher
core. All the analyzed hash functions in this thesis adopt block cipher-based compression functions.
There are many advantages for building a compression function from a block cipher. For instance,
block ciphers are usually well studied cryptographic primitives and various efficient implementations
for different block ciphers exist. Additionally, if a block cipher is already implemented on a device, a
block cipher-based hash function can be added to the system with minimal additional cost. Preneel et
al. [123] have analyzed the security of different modes of operation that are used for turning a block
cipher into a compression function. The three most frequently used modes are Davies-Meyer (DM),
Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) and Miyaguchi-Preneel (MP) which are shown in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Three main block cipher modes to construct compression functions.
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2.4 Overview of the Employed Cryptanalytic Methods
A successful cryptanalytic attack violates the security requirements of the cryptographic prim-
itive using effort less than that claimed by its designers. For example a block cipher key recovery
attack is expected to retrieve the k-bit master key with a time complexity less than 2k, which is the
time required by the generic brute force attack. A given cryptanalytic attack is characterized by the
following complexities:
- Time complexity: The amount of required computations to successfully launch the attack. Such
amount is usually expressed in terms of the number of executions of the analyzed cryptographic
primitive.
- Data complexity: The amount of both input and output data required to be available to the
attacker in order to successfully implement the attack. In the case of keyed primitives, the data
complexity often involves the number of queries to the encryption and/or decryption oracle.
- Memory complexity: The amount of storage required to perform the cryptanalytic attack.
In what follows, we give a brief description of the basic cryptanalytic techniques which are employed
in developing the attacks on the primitives that are investigated in this thesis.
- Differential cryptanalysis: Differential cryptanalysis [28] is one of the most important methods
for the analysis of hash functions and block ciphers. Particularly, most of the currently developed
cryptanalytic techniques are based on differential cryptanalysis. Such techniques include the rebound
attack [107], the boomerang attack [31, 140], and meet-in-the-middle attacks with differential enu-
meration [52]. In a differential attack, one tries to follow how the difference between two inputs
evolves after it propagates through execution rounds. The input difference propagation through linear
transformations is deterministic. However, a given input difference to a nonlinear transformation such
as an Sbox results in multiple output differences depending on the value of the input. Accordingly,
the cryptanalyst studies the differential properties [28] of the analyzed nonlinear layer and chooses
an output difference that occurs with high probability. Then, by adding more rounds, one constructs a
differential path whose probability is equal to the product of probabilities of the analyzed rounds. Now
given the output difference at the state before the last round and the corresponding ciphertext pairs,
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some bits of the last round subkey are guessed to compute the value of the portions of the state where
the output difference is given. The cryptanalyst then picks the guessed subkey bits that generated the
maximum number of results with a difference equal to the expected one as the right subkey bits. Since
one guesses only parts of the last round subkey which is usually smaller than the master key, signif-
icant gain over exhaustive key search is achieved. In the case of hash functions, since differences in
the execution state can be canceled by introducing differences in the message blocks, the attacker first
constructs a differential path that has zero output difference and then searches for a pair of messages
to follow it in order to produce a collision [143,144].
- Truncated differential cryptanalysis: Truncated differential cryptanalysis was proposed by Knud-
sen [89], and it proved to be effective against AES-based hash functions. A truncated trail is a differ-
ential path that does not specify the value of the differences in the path, but rather it indicates whether
a given bit/byte is active or not, i.e., the differences are not fully specified. Truncated differential
cryptanalysis was first applied by Knudsen on the round reduced DES [89] and Skipjack [91] block
ciphers. AES-based hash functions have been extensively analyzed using truncated differentials dur-
ing the SHA3 competition. Specifically, the rebound attack [107] and its improvements [95, 104, 121]
rely on truncated trails in describing the difference propagation. The rebound attack has been used to
analyze nearly all the AES-based SHA3 submissions including LANE [101], JH [128], Echo [75,121],
and Grøstl [107, 109, 121].
- Integral attacks: Integral cryptanalysis was proposed by Knudsen and Wagner in [88]. It is consid-
ered as a dual to differential cryptanalysis and is efficient against ciphers that are resistant to differen-
tial attacks. While in differential cryptanalysis, one considers the propagation of differences between
pairs of values to obtain probable differentials, in integral cryptanalysis, we consider the propagation
of sums of many values to obtain integrals. Integral cryptanalysis is specifically designed for block
ciphers which use only bijective transformations. An integral covers several rounds of the cipher and
describes how the summation properties of a set of input values would be affected by each successive
round.
Before being formalized in [88], the idea of integral attacks has been explored under several
names. It was first discovered during the analysis of the square cipher [43] and named the square
attack. Following this, the attack was generalized into the saturation attack and was used to analyze
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the Twofish cipher [98]. Ever since higher order integrals have been introduced in [88], integral crypt-
analysis has been used to analyze block ciphers in the known key setting [87, 113, 131] and to present
distinguishers for the components of hash functions.
- Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks: Meet in the middle (MitM) attacks have drawn a lot of attention since
the inception of the original attack which was proposed in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman [50] for the
analysis of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Soon after, the attack became a generic approach to be
used for the analysis of ciphers with non complicated key schedules. For this class of ciphers, one can
separate the execution into two independent parts where each part can be computed without guessing
all the bits of the master key. The first execution part covers encryption rounds from the plaintext to
some intermediate state and the other part covers decryption rounds from the corresponding ciphertext
to the same internal state. At this point, the attacker has knowledge of the same intermediate state
from two independent executions where the right key guess produces matching states. A typical MitM
attack can be launched with as low as one known plaintext-ciphertext pair. Accordingly, with the
recent growing interest in low data complexity attacks [35], MitM attacks have witnessed various
improvements and have been widely adopted for the analysis of various cryptographic primitives. The
increasing motivation for adopting low data complexity attacks for the analysis of ciphers is backed
by the fact that security bounds are better perceived in a realistic model. Particularly, in a real life
scenario, security protocols impose restrictions on the amount of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that can be
eavesdropped and/or the number of queries permitted under the same key. MitM attacks have been
applied on block ciphers such as AES [47, 48, 52] and LBlock [10]. In the context of hash functions,
MitM attacks are used to generate preimages [132,150]
- Fault Analysis Attacks: Fault analysis is an implementation dependent attack where the attacker
applies some kind of physical intervention during the computation of the internal state of the primitive
to corrupt random or known bits in the state. Consequently, the attacker observes the correct and faulty
outputs and performs some analysis to gain non negligible information about the secret information
embedded in the hardware. Fault injection can be done in many ways which include power glitches,
clock pulses, and laser radiation [42, 136].
Fault analysis was first introduced when Boneh et al. showed how the private key of the RSA-
CRT-algorithm can be successfully recovered by observing the correct signature and then injecting
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a fault and acquiring the faulty signature [34]. Afterwards, Biham and Shamir extended the idea
to cover symmetric-key primitives where they introduced differential fault analysis (DFA) [29]. DFA
combines fault analysis with differential cryptanalysis where the difference between faulty and genuine
ciphertexts is exploited. DFA attacks have been widely used for recovering the secret inputs of block
ciphers and keyed hash functions [55, 64, 85, 139].
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Chapter 3
Collision Analysis of Streebog
In this chapter, we investigate the collision resistance of the Russian cryptographic hashing
standard GOST R 34.11-2012, also known as Streebog, where we analyze its compression function
and internal cipher with respect to rebound attacks. First, we analyze the differential properties of
the Streebog Sbox differential distribution table and show how these properties affect the complexity
of the rebound attack. As for the internal cipher, we introduce differences in both the key schedule
and message encryption, and propose a new message differential path such that a local collision is
enforced every two rounds. Accordingly, the Sbox matching complexity caused by its differential bias
is bypassed. As a result, we efficiently produce free-start 5-round collision and 7-round near collision
examples for the internal cipher. Moreover, we show that the compression function is vulnerable to
semi free-start 7.75 round collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round near collision attacks and present an example
for a 4.75 round 50-byte near colliding message pair. Our results are summarized in Table 3.1 .










Semi free-start near collision (50 bytes)8.75 2128 28
9.75 2184 28
Table 3.1: Summary of our collision analysis of Streebog.
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3.1 Introduction
The attacks byWang et al. onMD5 [144] and SHA-1 [143] followed by the SHA-3 competition
[118] have led to a flurry in the area of hash function cryptanalysis. The primary targets of these
attacks are the Add-Rotate-Xor (ARX) based hash functions where one can find differential patterns
that propagate with acceptable probabilities. Additionally, using message modification techniques,
significant complexity reduction is achieved. Consequently, during the SHA-3 competition, different
design concepts were introduced, out of which are the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based
designs that are known for their resistance to standard differential attacks due to the wide trail strategy.
The ISO standard Whirlpool [126], the SHA-3 finalist Grøstl [60], and the new Russian hash standard
Streebog [2] are among the proposed AES-based hash functions.
Streebog was proposed in 2010 [102]. It has an output length of 512/256-bit. The compression
function employs a 12-round AES-like cipher with 88-byte internal state preceded with one round of
nonlinear whitening of the chaining value. The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel
(MP) mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damga˚rd domain extender with a finalization step [2]. Streebog
officially replaces the previous standard GOST R 34.11-94 which has been theoretically broken in
[105,106] and recently analyzed in [103].
Due to the significance of this standard, its security has been thoroughly investigated in a se-
ries of works appearing in a relatively short time. These works include the analysis of the collision
resistance of its compression function and internal cipher by AlTawy et al. [7] and Wang et al. [145].
An integral analysis of the compression function has been presented by AlTawy and Youssef where
integral distinguishers for the reduced compression function was proposed [11]. Moreover, preimage
attacks on the reduced hash function have been independently proposed by Altawy and Youssef [12]
and Zou et al. [152], and later the attacks were improved by Bingka et al. [99]. Also, Kazymyrov
and Kazymyrova presented an analysis of the algebraic aspects of the function [79], and a long second
preimage attack was proposed by Guo et al. [65]. Furthermore, a malicious version of the whole hash
function where practical collisions are generated was presented in [17]. Finally, the function was in-
vestigated in the secret-key setting and a differential fault analysis attack has been proposed in [14] to
recover the secret key when Streebog is used in various MAC schemes.
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The rebound attack is a differential attack [107] proposed by Mendel et al. during the SHA-3
competition to construct differential paths for AES-based hash functions. Previous literature related to
the rebound attack includes Mendel et al. first proposal on the ISO standard Whirlpool and the SHA-3
finalist Grøstl [107, 108]. In particular, Mendel et al. presented a 4.5-round collision, 5.5-round semi
free-start collision and 7.5-round near collision attacks on the Whirlpool compression function. As
for Grøstl-256, a 6-round semi free-start collision is given. Subsequently, rebound attacks have been
applied to other AES-based hash functions such as LANE [101], JH [128], and Echo [75]. Various
tweaks have been applied to the basic rebound attack in order to construct differential paths that cover
more rounds such as merging multiple in-bounds [95], super Sbox cryptanalysis [63], extended 5-
round inbound [95], and linearized match-in-the-middle and start-from-the-middle techniques [104].
Lastly, Sasaki et al. [132] presented a free-start collision and near collision attacks on Whirlpool by
inserting difference in the intermediate keys to cancel the difference propagation in the message and
thus creating local collisions every 4 rounds. Previous work findings were often reported on reduced
rounds of the compression function, internal block cipher and/or its internal permutations [104,106].
In the first part of this chapter, we investigate the security of the Streebog hash function, assessing
its resistance to rebound attacks. We efficiently produce free-start collision and near collision for
the internal cipher (E) reduced to 5 and 7.75 rounds by employing the concept of local collisions.
Specifically, we present a message differential path such that a local collision is enforced every 2
rounds. Thus we bypass the complexity of the rebound matching in the message in-bounds by using
the same differentials as in the key path. Consequently, in contrast to [132], finding one key satisfying
the key path is practically sufficient for finding a message pair following the message path.
In the second part of this chapter, we present a practical 4.75 round 50 (out of 64) bytes near
colliding message pair for the compression function and show that it is vulnerable to semi free-start
7.75 round collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round near collision attacks. Examples for the internal cipher at-
tacks and the 4.75 round compression function near-collision attack are provided to validate our results.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the specification of the
Streebog hash function along with the notation used throughout the chapter are provided. A brief
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overview of the rebound attack is given in Section 3.3. Afterwards, in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we provide
detailed description of our attacks, differential patterns, and the complexities of the attacks. Finally,
the chapter is concluded in Section 3.6.
3.2 Specification of Streebog
Streebog outputs a 512 or 256-bit hash value, where half the last state is truncated when adopt-
ing the 256-bit output. The standard specifies two different IVs to be used with the two output lengths.
The function can process messages of length up to 2512   1. The compression function iterates over
12 rounds of an AES-like cipher with an 8  8 byte internal state and a final round of key mixing.
The compression function operates in Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and is plugged in Merkle-Damga˚rd
domain extender with a finalization step. The input message M is padded into a multiple of 512
bits by appending one followed by zeros. The message length for MD-strengthening is further in-
cluded as an extra separate block, followed by a block of a checksum evaluated by the modulo 2512
addition of all message blocks as a finalization step. More precisely, let n = bjM j
512
c and the in-
put message M = xkmnk::km1km0, where jM j is length of M , and x is an un-complete or an
empty block. The message is padded as follows: let mn+1 = 0511 jxjk1kx, then the padded mes-
sage M = mn+1kmnk::km1km0. Let  = mn+1 + :: + m1 + m0. The compression function gN is
Figure 3.1: The Streebog compression function gN
parameterized by N which is the counter for the bits that are hashed so far, where N = 0 when the
compression function is used in the finalization stage and thus it is denoted by g0. The compression
function gN is fed with three inputs: the chaining value hi 1, a message block mi 1, and the counter
of bits hashed so far Ni 1 = 512  i. (see Figure 3.1). Let hi be a 512-bit chaining variable. The
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first state is loaded with the initial value IV and assigned to h0. The hash value of M is computed as
follows:
hi  gN(hi 1;mi 1; Ni 1) for i = 1; 2; ::; n+ 2
hn+3  g0(hn+2; jM j)
h(M) g0(hn+3; );
where h(M) is the hash value ofM . As depicted in Figure 3.1, the compression function gN consists
of:
 KN : a nonlinear whitening round of the chaining value. It takes a 512-bit chaining variable hi 1
and a counter of the bits hashed so far Ni 1 and outputs a 512-bit keyK.
 E: an AES-based cipher that iterates over the message for 12 rounds in addition to a finalization
key mixing round. The cipher E takes a 512-bit key K and a 512-bit message block m as a
plaintext. As shown in Figure 3.2, it consists of two similar parallel flows for the state update
and the key scheduling.
Figure 3.2: The internal block cipher (E)
Both KN and E operate on an 8  8 byte key state K. E updates an additional 8  8 byte message
stateM . In one round, a given state is updated by the following sequence of transformations:
 AddKey(X): XOR with either a round key, a constant, or the counter of bits hashed so far (N).
 SubBytes (S): A nonlinear byte bijective mapping.
 Transposition (P): Byte permutation.
 Linear Transformation (L): Row multiplication by an MDS matrix in GF(2).
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Initially, stateK is loaded with the chaining value hi 1 and updated by KN as follows:
k0 = L  P  S X[Ni 1](K):
Now K contains the key k0 to be used by the cipher E. The message state M is initially loaded with
the message block m and E(k0;m) runs the key scheduling function on state K to generate 12 round
keys k1; k2; ::; k12 as follows:
ki = L  P  S X[Ci 1](ki 1), for i = 1; 2; ::; 12;
where Ci 1 is the ith round constant. The stateM is updated as follows:
Mi = L  P  S X[ki 1](Mi 1), for i = 1; 2; :::; 12:
The final round output is given by E(k0;m) = M12 k12. The output of gN in the Miyaguchi-Preneel
mode is E(KN(hi 1; Ni 1);mi 1)mi 1 hi 1 as shown in Figure 1. For further details, the reader
is referred to [2].
- Notation: Let M and K be (8  8)-byte states denoting the message and key state, respectively.
The following notation will be used throughout the chapter:
 Mi: The message state at the beginning of round i.
 MUi : The message state after the U transformation at round i, where U 2 fX;S; P; Lg.
 Mi[r, c]: A byte at row r and column c of stateMi.
 Mi[row r]: Eight bytes located at row r ofMi state.
 Mi[col c]: Eight bytes located at column c ofMi state.
 m ri ! n: A transition from anm active bytes state at round i to an n active bytes state at round
i+ 1.
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Figure 3.3: The inbound phase of the rebound attack.
 m ri   n: A transition from an n active bytes state at round i + 1 to an m active bytes state at
round i.
Same notation applies to K.
3.3 The Rebound Attack
The rebound attack [107] is proposed by Mendel et al. for the cryptanalysis of AES-based hash
functions. It is a differential attack that follows the inside-out or start from the middle approach which
is used in the boomerang attack [140]. The rebound attack is composed of three phases, one inbound
and two outbounds. The compression function, internal block cipher or permutation of a hash function
is divided into three parts. If C is a block cipher, then C is expressed as C = Cfw  Cin  Cbw. The
middle part is the inbound phase and the forward and backward parts are the two outbound phases. In
the inbound phase, a low probability XOR differential path is used and all possible degrees of freedom
are used to satisfy the inbound path. In the two outbound phases, high probability truncated paths [89]
are used. In other words, one starts from the middle satisfying Cin, then hash forward and backward
to satisfy Cfw and Cbw probabilistically. For an 8  8 byte state, the basic rebound attack finds two
states satisfying an inbound phase over two rounds 8 ri ! 64 ri+1 ! 8. The main idea is to pick random
differences at each of the two eight active bytes sates. Then propagate both backward and forward until
the output and input of the full active state Sbox, respectively. Using the Sbox differential distribution
table (DDT), find values that satisfy input and output differentials. This process is further illustrated in
Figure 3.3. The last step of the attack is called the Sbox matching phase and its complexity depends on
the Sbox DDT. If the probability of differentials that have solutions is p, then the matching probability
is given by p8. In the following, we analyze the Sbox used in Streebog and investigate how it affects
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the complexity of the rebound attack. The Streebog Sbox DDT has the following properties:
 Out of the 65536 differentials, there are 27300 possible non trivial differentials, i.e., nonzero
(input, output) difference pairs that have solutions. Thus the probability that a randomly chosen
differential is possible  0:42 = 2 1:3
 Each possible differential can have 2, 4, 6, or 8 solutions.
 A given input difference has a minimum of 98 and a maximum of 114 output differences.
 A given output difference has a minimum of 90 and a maximum of 128 input differences.
 For a given input (output) difference the average number of output (input) difference is 107.
From the analysis of the Sbox DDT, one can estimate the complexity of the inbound matching part of
the rebound attack. Let us consider the basic inbound path 8 r1 ! 64 r2 ! 8. One can find a pair of
states satisfying this path as follows:
1. Compute the Sbox DDT.
2. Choose a random 8 differences forML2 active bytes.
3. Propagate the differences inML2 backwards untilM
S
2 (output difference).
4. for each row inMP1
a. Choose a random difference for one active byte, propagate it forward to MX2 (input dif-
ference). Propagating one active byte in MP1 through the L transformation results in full
active row inMX2 .
b. Using the Sbox DDT, determine if the corresponding row differences inMX2 andM
S
2 have
solutions. If one byte differential pair is not possible, go to step 4.a.
One can repeat step (4.a) at most 28 times since we variate only one byte. However, the success prob-
ability of step 4.b. (finding solutions for the whole active row) is 2 1:38  2 10 which cannot be
easily satisfied by randomizing one byte difference. One would often have to restart at step 2, i.e., pick
another output difference. The same situation takes place when we move to the next row and pick a
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new output difference. In this case we have to start from row 0. As a result, the complexity of finding
solutions to the 8 rows is not purely added [107]. Based on our experimental results, the complexity of
this inbound path is in the order of 218. However finding this match means finding at least 264 actual




2  (input difference) follow the inbound path. Each
value out of the 264 values is a new starting point to satisfy the two outbound paths. In the following
section, we present our attack on the internal block cipher of the Streebog compression function.
All the compression function paths require that the full active state which is the most expensive
part of the path to be placed in the middle and consequently difference in the first and last sates must
be equal so that they cancel out after feedforward. To efficiently extend the attack to more rounds,
several proposals that solve wider inbounds have been published in [104]. In Section 3.4, we briefly
recall two of the practical proposals which we use in our attack.
3.4 Attacks on the Internal Block Cipher (E)
Verifying the ideal behaviour of the internal primitives of a hash function is important to evalu-
ate its resistance to distinguishing attacks [37]. In this section we investigate the internal block cipher
(E) and, by employing the idea of successive local collisions, we present a message differential path
that collides every two rounds. This message differential path enables us to efficiently produce 5-round
semi free-start collision and 7.75-round 40 bytes (out of 64) semi free-start near collision. The main
idea of our approach is to first find a pair of keys that follows a given differential path and then use it
to search for a pair of messages satisfying the message path. The approach of creating local collisions
works perfectly if the key and the message flows are identical and the initial key is the input chain-
ing value. To this end, one can keep similar differential patterns and the state message difference is
cancelled after the X transformation, so that a collision is obtained after the Miyaguchi-Preneel feed-
forward. However, in the compression function of Streebog the key used in the internal cipher is the
result of applying theKN transformation on the input chaining value. Similar differential patterns can
be obtained when considering the internal block cipher. In our attack on the Streebog internal cipher,
we present a message differential path such that a local collision is enforced every two rounds. Specif-
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Figure 3.4: 7.75 round differential path. Active bytes are gray colored. Ellipses mark the row and
column restricted by the two inbounds.
ically, we first search for a pair of keys that satisfies the key differential path, then we use the Sbox
differentials in the key path for the message path. Consequently, we bypass the complexity caused by
the Sbox DDT matching in the message differential path and only one key pair is required to search
for a message pair. In [132], Sasaki et al. presented a message differential path that creates local
collisions every four rounds for the Whirlpool compression function and reported that they had to try
109 key pairs to search for a message pair that collides every 4 round. Furthermore, they estimated an
increase in the message search complexity by a factor of 27 and attributed this to the imbalance of the
Sbox DDT. Given the Streebog Sbox DDT, finding one key pair that follows the 8-round differential
path takes up to two hours on a 4-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz. Accordingly, it is important
that the message differential path requires only one key pair to be satisfied. In what follows, we give
the details of our approach.
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3.4.1 5-round Free-start Collision
Since the Streebog’s Sbox DDT is biased with possible differential probability  0:42, we
bypass the Sbox matching phase by using a message differential path such that local collisions are
created every two rounds. The used key and message paths are given by:
Key: 64 r1 ! 8 r2 ! 1 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 64
Message: 64 r1 ! 0 r2 ! 1 r3 ! 0 r4 ! 64 r5 ! 0
This message differential path allows us to bypass the rebound matching part completely in our mes-
sage search because the same input and output Sbox differences in the key path are used for the
message path. Thus the matching probability is 1. Unlike the differential paths in [132], our message
differential path is satisfied practically using only one key pair. In this attack, we do not use the match-
ing part of the rebound attack in either the key or the message; we only search for one byte value in
the message to find a common solution between two rounds which can be considered as a meet in the
middle approach. As depicted in Figure 3.4, the steps for finding a key pair can be summarized as
follows:
1. Choose a random difference and a random value for byte KL2 [3, 3]
2. Hash backward until K1.
3. Hash forward until K5.











4 , and K
S
4 , respectively. Having the same
differences in the message states as in the key states implies that no differential matching is needed at
the Sboxes of rounds 2 and 4, and guarantees that the differences in K3 and M3 cancel out. Similar
observation applies to K5 andM5.
To search for a conforming message pair, we need to find a common solution between the
Sboxes of rounds 2 and 4 possible solutions. This can be achieved as follows. Since MX2 [col 3] and
MS2 [col 3] differentials are possible, then from the Sbox DDT there are at least 2
8 values forMX2 [col 3]
33
that satisfy the path untilMS3 . For all solutionM
X





is one column after the P , L, X , and S transformations, its transformed value becomes MS3 [row 3]
as indicated by the ellipse in Figure 3.4. We store all possible values of MS3 [row 3] in a list l. As for
MX4 [row 3], andM
S
4 [row 3], hashing all possible solutions backwards restricts the values ofM
S
3 [col 3].
However we do not store the results in a another list. Because the two restricted results intersect in
only one byte MS3 [3, 3] (the intersection of the two ellipses in Figure 3.4), we compare byte [3, 3] of
each backward result against byte [3, 3] from each entry in list l. The success probability for finding
a one byte match is 2 8 which can be easily fulfilled by the number of entries in l. Once a match is
found, we assign the matching list row to MS3 [row 3] and the backwards column to M
S
3 [col 3]. The
rest of the 49 unrestricted bytes are free and can be used to satisfy a longer outbound.
3.4.2 8-round Collision and 7.75-round Near Collision Attacks
Extending the 5 round path to 8 rounds adds complexity to the key search part because we need
to use an improved version of the rebound attack to get a key pair following a longer differential path.
We employ the following message and key differential paths:
Key: 64 r1 ! 8 r2 ! 1 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 64 r5 ! 8 r6 ! 8 r7 ! 64
Message: 64 r1 ! 0 r2 ! 1 r3 ! 0 r4 ! 64 r5 ! 0 r6 ! 8 r7 ! 8 r8 ! 0
and use the start form the middle technique [104] to solve the key inbound phase between rounds 3
and 5. This approach finds states following a 1  ! 8  ! 64  ! 8 transition. Unlike the basic
inbound that yields 264 solutions, using this approach on Streebog results in only one solution. For
AES Sboxes, a solution is expected in a time complexity of 28 and memory complexity of 28. However,
for Streebog’s biased Sbox DDT, one practical solution is found between 33 minutes to 2 hours on an
4-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz. Accordingly, it is crucial that the key outbound phase has
high probability if one is aiming for practical results and no rebound matching is used in the message
search so that one key is enough to get a conforming message pair. In the following steps, we briefly
describe the procedure we used for solving the 1  ! 8  ! 64  ! 8 key inbound phase. Figure 3.5
further illustrates the process.
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Figure 3.5: Start from the middle approach.
1. Solve the basic inbound 8  ! 64   8 as explained in Section 3.
2. From the DDT, each byte difference in KX5 has at least 2 and at most 8 values, such that any
value satisfies the path from KX4 to K6.
3. To enforce the transition from 8 active bytes in KX4 to 1 active byte in K
P
3 , do the following:
a. Create a table TL of all possible 255 byte difference values d3 (candidates for KP3 [3, 3])
and their corresponding 8 byte difference values L(d3) (candidates for KX4 [row 3]). These
values are the result of applying the linear transformation L to a difference at column 3.
b. Each candidate difference for KX4 [row 3] has 8 active bytes that can be manipulated inde-
pendently. More precisely, to change the difference value of byte i in KX4 [row 3], one has
to switch between 28 or more possible values of KX5 [row i]. As illustrated by the ellipses
in Figure 3.5, a change in the values of KX5 [row 0] is reflected on the difference value of
byte 0 inKX4 [row 3]
c. Go through the entries in table TL and change the values of KX5 rows one by one until a
match is found, if not, restart from step 1.
In [104], the authors follow a different process that consists of three phases to solve this inbound.
Their process is supposed to take less time (25 vs 28) but more memory requirements are needed.
However, for Streebog’s DDT both approaches were close in the running time and we only needed one
key. Finally, by hashing the obtained key pair two rounds backward and two rounds forward, we get
a conforming key pair that follows the key differential path. Once we have the key, we can directly
get a message pair in the same way as explained in the previous section for the 5-round collision.
This message pair satisfies the message differential path up until ML6 . However, to have an 8-round
collision, we need the difference in K8 to cancel the difference in M8 after the X transformation in
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round 8. Since both L and P transformations are linear, then this condition is satisfied if the 8 byte
differences in KS7 and M
S
7 are equal. The difference in K
S
7 is already set from the key search stage,
so we randomize the 49 unrestricted bytes in MS3 , hash forward till M
S
7 and compare the resulting
8 differences with KS7 . The probability that the 8 byte differences are equal is 2
 64. To verify the
applicability of this attack, we have implemented a 7.75-round near collision attack where we were
checking if only 5 out of 8 byte differences are equal inMS7 and K
S
7 . In Figure 3.4, the implemented
7.75-round differential pattern, with 240 time and 28 state memory complexities is given. Table 3.3
shows an example for a free-start 5-round collision and 7.75-round near collision for the internal
cipher (E). Both the 5-round semi free-start collision and the 7.75 semi free-start near collision are
demonstrated by one example because the 7.75 semi free-start near collision path collides at round 5.
3.5 Attacks on the Streebog Compression Function
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the compression function of Streebog employs a nonlinear whiten-
ing round KN of the chaining value. This extra round randomizes the chaining value before being
introduced as a key for the block cipher E. As long as there is no difference in the chaining value,
most of the differential trails proposed for Whirlpool are also applicable on the Streebog compression
function.
In what follows, we consider semi free-start collision attacks on the compression function. Because
of the extra round KN which is as a whitening stage for the chaining value, a free-start collision
would not be feasible. This is due to the feedforward and the asymmetry in the key and message
flows. Several approaches are used to extend the inbound phase can be used to construct collision
paths for the compression function. The extended 5 round inbound presented in [95] finds a pair of
states satisfying the 8 r1 ! 64 r2 ! 8 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 64 r5 ! 8 transition in 264 time and 28 memory. The
main idea is to solve two independent 8 r1 ! 64 r2 ! 8 and 8 r4 ! 64 r5 ! 8 inbounds and use the
freedom to choose key values that connect the resulting 8 differences and 64 byte values. However,
unlike the basic inbound, it provides only one solution or starting point for the outbound paths. Using
different outbounds with the extended inbound, a semi free-start 7.75-round collision, and 7.75-round,
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8.75-round, and 9.75-round near collisions are obtained.
7.75-round Semi Free-start Collision.
This is obtained by using two outbounds in the form of 8  ! 1. The probability of a transition
from 8 active bytes to 1 active byte through L is 2 87 = 2 56. Given the following path:
1
r1 ! 8 r2 ! 64 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 8 r5 ! 64 r6 ! 8 r7 ! 1;
one can produce a semi free-start collision. We need two transitions from 8 to 1 in both the forward
and backward directions, and the one active byte in the first and last states to be equal so that they
cancel out after the feedforward. Thus, one needs to try 256+56+8 times to satisfy the outbound phase.
In other words, we need 2120 inbound solutions. If the complexity of one inbound solution is 264, then
the time complexity of 7.75 rounds semi free-start collision is 2184 and the memory complexity is 28,
as we can pass one active byte through X, S and P transformations with probability one.
7.75-round Semi Free-start Near Collision.
While aiming for collision requires both differences in the first and last states to be exactly in the
same place so that they cancel out after the feedforward, near collision requires only few differences to
cancel out. A 50-byte near collision is obtained by extending the 5-round inbound with two transitions
from 8 to 8 in both directions with no additional cost. Using the following path:
8
r1 ! 8 r2 ! 64 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 8 r5 ! 64 r6 ! 8 r7 ! 8
one active byte would cancel out with probability 2 8 after feedforward. Consequently, The complex-
ity of 7.75 rounds semi free-start 50-byte collision is 272. To demonstrate the correctness of the above
concept, we have implemented a 4.75-round 50-byte near collision with a shorter practical inbound
8
r2 ! 64 r3 ! 8 as shown in Figure 3.6 with a time complexity of 218. A 4.75-round near colliding
pair is given in Table 3.2 using the IV = 0 and N = 0.
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Figure 3.6: 4.75 round near collision path
8.75-round Semi Free-start Near Collision.
Using one transition from 8 to 1 in the forward outbound has a complexity of 256 and results in
the following path:
8
r1 ! 8 r2 ! 64 r3 ! 8 r4 ! 8 r5 ! 64 r6 ! 8 r7 ! 1 r8 ! 8
The probability that one active byte is canceled by the feedforward is 2 8. Consequently the complex-
ity of 8.75 rounds semi free-start 50-byte collision is 264+56+8 = 2120.
9.75-round Semi Free-start Near Collision.
With a complexity of 2196, a 9.75-round 50-byte near collision can be obtained with a lower
complexity of 2184. By adding two 8 to 1 transitions in both the forward and the backward directions
for a complexity of 2112 and two 1 to 8 transitions in rounds one (backward) and nine (forward) for no
additional cost, the following path:
8
r1 ! 1 r2 ! 8 r3 ! 64 r4 ! 8 r5 ! 8 r6 ! 64 r7 ! 8 r8 ! 1 r9 ! 8




In this chapter, we have analyzed the collision resistance of the Streebog compression function
and internal cipher. As for the internal cipher, we have proposed a new message differential path such
that a local collision is enforced every two rounds. Accordingly, the Sbox matching complexity caused
by its DDT bias is bypassed. As a result, we have efficiently produced free-start 5-round collision
and 7.75-round near collision examples for the internal cipher. Moreover, the compression function
is investigated and we have noted that the Streebog compression function key whitening round KN
enhances its resistance to free-start collision attacks. However, we have showed that the Streebog
compression function is vulnerable to semi free-start 7.75 round collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round near
collision attacks and presented an example for a 4.75 round 50-byte near colliding message pair.
It should be noted that our results considers only complete full round, after which, the feedfor-
ward is applied. More specifically, unlike the results presented in [99, 145], we respect the wide trail
strategy and all of our results that are given on n + 0:75 rounds are in fact applicable on the n-round
versions. On the other hand, all the results presented in [99, 145] try to align the input and output
differences of the differential path by applying the feedforward in the middle of the round after the
transpose transformation.
m m0 Difference atM4
cd ed 17 46 d8 d7 f0 f3 cd ed 17 59 d8 d7 f0 f3 00 00 00 1f 00 00 00 00
3e d6 22 7a 99 4a c9 ea 3e d6 22 0c 99 4a c9 ea 00 00 00 76 00 00 00 00
cc 5d e2 f0 14 4f f0 3c cc 5d e2 ea 14 4f f0 3c 00 00 00 1a 00 00 00 00
4b bc 31 41 dd 99 68 0d 4b bc 31 4d dd 99 68 0d ba 38 7a 00 6f 93 95 37
b4 d1 27 0f 2d ed 55 28 b4 d1 27 58 2d ed 55 28 00 00 00 57 00 00 00 00
d8 ca c8 79 22 fa c8 14 d8 ca c8 f6 22 fa c8 14 00 00 00 8f 00 00 00 00
9f 06 fe 94 b3 3d 20 6a 9f 06 fe 80 b3 3d 20 6a 00 00 00 14 00 00 00 00
5a d6 10 10 51 4c a3 7a 5a d6 10 2b 51 4c a3 7a 00 00 00 3b 00 00 00 00
Table 3.2: Example of a 4.75-round near collision for the compression function.
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m m0 Difference atMP7
ba aa da d1 92 9e 95 f5 3b 16 1b b0 76 fe 1e 78
3a 4a 35 2c 61 a8 84 f1 4c 03 4f 12 d1 a3 b4 bd
44 38 38 e2 d2 fa 5e ec c6 a7 81 ff 3a c7 3e 36
27 00 09 05 4f 53 05 f2 6c 76 3e 0a d6 92 72 00
cd 02 30 bb 3e b4 54 df 47 7e c6 e0 a4 6e 23 1a
fc c6 de 98 54 4e 5c b6 28 a4 20 68 ee e1 01 11 d7 4d 00 c8 00 00 00 00
60 dc 52 73 dc c9 5d f1 43 20 0a 43 12 ba fe a0 ff 60 00 60 00 00 00 00
72 99 45 8d 9b c8 73 f2 8a d2 ff b3 19 f4 e4 25 15 3c 00 c9 00 00 00 00
1b 49 00 ae 00 00 00 00
k k0 03 81 00 42 00 00 00 00
1a ed 00 ea 00 00 00 00
f4 d7 d6 42 05 a4 b9 7a 75 6b 17 23 e1 c4 32 f7 37 8e 00 60 00 00 00 00
2f 70 68 1a 2c 59 f4 4e 59 39 12 24 9c 52 c4 02 61 b8 00 f2 00 00 00 00
8b 7b 44 12 38 36 84 87 09 e4 fd 0f d0 0b e4 5d
63 04 2f 7d de 3d b9 9f 28 72 18 72 47 fc ce 6d
78 db 37 55 73 39 f7 30 f2 a7 c1 0e e9 e3 80 f5
3f f2 8d fb 23 a9 6a 8a eb 90 73 0b 99 06 37 2d
20 18 3a e4 63 85 3a 81 03 e4 62 d4 ad f6 99 d0
b5 58 8a e7 d3 34 20 4d 4d 13 30 d9 51 08 b7 9a




Integral Distinguishers for Streebog
In this chapter, we investigate the structural integral properties of reduced-round versions of
the Streebog compression function and its internal permutation. Specifically, we present forward and
backward higher order integrals that can be used to distinguish 4 and 3.5 rounds, respectively. Us-
ing the start from the middle approach, we combine the two proposed integrals to get 6.5-round and
7.5-round distinguishers for the internal permutation and 6-round and 7-round distinguishers for the
compression function using 264 and 2120 middle input states, respectively. Moreover, following the
simplified representation of AES [62], we extend our original work to 8 rounds by considering an
alternative representation of the twelve rounds Streebog internal cipher. In Table 4.1, we provide a
summary of our results on the underlying primitives of the Streebog hash function.










Table 4.1: Summary of the integral cryptanalysis results on the Streebog primitives.
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4.1 Introduction
Modern cryptanalytic approaches target both the hash function and its underlying ciphers or
permutations as these components are expected to provide certain properties and verifying their ideal
behaviour is important to evaluate the resistance of the hash function to distinguishing attacks [37].
Particularly, the analysis of hash functions underlying block ciphers or permutations has resulted in
new attack models for block ciphers, e.g., known key [87]. Such model is due to the fact that there is
no secret key when block cipher based structures are used as the hash function building blocks.
In the first part of the chapter, we focus on the integral properties and their applications to
present the first known integral distinguishers for the Russian cryptographic hash standard compres-
sion function and its internal permutation. We present a 4-round 8th order integral for the forward
direction and a 3.5-round 8th order integral for the backward direction, where both integrals are sat-
isfied by 264 inputs. In the second part, we present 6.5-round and 7.5-round distinguisher for the
internal permutation using 264 and 2120 middle inputs, respectively and 6-round and 7-round integral
distinguishers for the compression function that are satisfied by 264 and 2120 middle input states, re-
spectively. Lastly, we show how using the simplified representation of AES [62], we can extend our
attacks on the compression function to cover 8 rounds.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of integral
cryptanalysis is given. Afterwards, in Sections 4.3, we provide detailed description of the integral pat-
terns and the complexities of the distinguishers. An alternative representation of the Streebog internal
cipher and an 8-round integral distinguisher for the compression function are given in Section 4.4.
Finally, the chapter is concluded in Section 4.5.
4.2 Integral cryptanalysis
Integral cryptanalysis was proposed by Knudsen and Wagner in [88]. It is considered as a dual
to differential cryptanalysis and is efficient against ciphers that are resistant to differential attacks.
While In differential cryptanalysis, one considers the propagation of differences between pairs of val-
42
ues to obtain probable differentials, in integral cryptanalysis, we consider the propagation of sums of
many values to obtain integrals. Integral cryptanalysis is specifically designed for block ciphers which
use only bijective transformations. An integral is a set of values with a specific input and output sums.
It covers several rounds of the cipher and describes how the summation properties of a set of input
values would be affected by each successive round.
Before being formalized in [88], the idea of integral attacks has been explored under several
names. It was first discovered during the analysis of the square cipher [43] and named the square
attack. Following this, the attack was generalized into the saturation attack and was used to analyze
the Twofish cipher [98]. Ever since higher order integrals have been introduced in [88], integral crypt-
analysis has been used to analyze block ciphers in the known key setting [87, 113, 131] and to present
distinguishers for the components of hash functions.
Integrals properties.
For a given collection of (88)-byte states, a typical integral usesm chosen input states, where
m equals 28 (number of active bytes). A state byte position can have any of the following properties:
 C: A constant byte, where all the bytes at this position in the m states are equal. However, If
two byte position at the same state have the C property, that does not necessarily mean that they
are equal.
 A: An active byte, where all the bytes at this position in the m states are different. Specifically,
ifm = 28, then each byte in that position takes a value between 0 and 28   1 only once.
 Ad: An active byte that participates in a dth-order integral. If a byte takes 28 different values,
then Ad means that this particular byte takes all values exactly 28(d 1) times. A byte with the Ad
property also satisfies the A property.
 Adi : An active byte that participates in a dth-order integral within a group. In particular, the string
concatenation of all bytes with subscript i take the 28d values exactly once. A byte with the Adi
property satisfies both the Ad and A property.
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Figure 4.1: A 3-round first order integral for Rijndael
 S: The sum of all bytes at this position can be predicted. All the C, A, Ad, and Adi properties
satisfies the S property where their predictable sum is zero. The S property is the weakest of
them all as it reveals so little about the relation between bytes at similar positions in a set of
states.
In order to be able to use an integral as a distinguisher, we expect that at least one entry in the output set
of values satisfies a predictable property. Similar to truncated differentials [89] where one considers
if a specific entry is active or not, in a given integral we consider if an input has an A property or a
C property. As mentioned earlier, a typical integral uses 28# active bytes inputs. An integral having one
active byte is called a first order integral and can be satisfied with 28 chosen inputs. On the other hand
considering an integral with a group of active bytes results in a higher order integral.
An example of a 3-round first order integral for Rijndeal is given in the first proposal [88] by
Knudsen and Wagner and is shown in Figure 4.1. To further explain the idea of integral propagation
through successive rounds, we give a detailed example on the above Rijndeal first order integral. One
round applies 4 transformations on a state , which are byte substitution (SB), row cyclic shifting (SR),
linear transformation (MC), and Key addition (AK). Consider a set of 28 input states, such that they
have different values in M [0, 0] and equal values in the rest of the fifteen bytes. the transformation
SB keeps the same property because it is bijective so each byte is substituted with a unique one. Af-
terwards, the SR transformation affects only the constant bytes keeping the state of the integral as is,
then the MC transformation mixes the active byte with three constant bytes in column 0 and results
in a column full of active bytes. Finally, due to the fact that the AK transformation XORs the same
key with all the 256 state, the sum of all states remain the same at the end of the round. As with
differential propagation, after two encryption rounds all the sixteen bytes in all the 256 states become
active. However, this integral can go one more encryption round and we get a 256 states that sum to
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zero in all the sixteen byte positions.
Constructing a integral distinguisher can be viewed as a zero sum problem. Accordingly, to
estimate the expected complexity of having a random set of states produce a distinguisher with a final
balanced properties, the k-sum problem [141] was introduced in [87] to model this complexity. The
k-sum problem finds a set of k inputs x1; ::::; xk such
Pk
i=1 f(xi) = 0 for a given permutation f . This
problem has a time and memory complexity of O(k2n=(1+log2k)), where n is the size of the state in
bits. The k-sum problem is the best generic known approach suited to this case to find the zero sum.
However, it does not provide the structured propertied of the distinguisher as hashing rounds progress
and has high memory requirements.
Previous literature related to integral cryptanalysis of hash functions include the analysis of
Minier et al. of the three SHA-3 candidates; Hamsi-256, LANE-256 and Grøstl-512 [112] and recently
Grøstl-512 [114], and Knudsen’s attack on whirlpool internal block cipher [86].
4.3 Distinguishers for the Streebog Primitives
The compression function of the Streebog hash function employs an AES-based cipher. In
Figure 4.2, we present an 8th order integral distinguisher for the Streebog internal cipher. In this
distinguisher, the sum of all the bytes in all the states after four rounds of encryption with the same
key is equal zero. To build this distinguisher, we consider 264 input statesM1 that have equal values in
56 bytes and differ in only eight bytes. These states differs in the eight bytes in column three such that
each stateM1[col 3] (out of the 264) state takes a value between 0 and 264   1 only once (the place of
the column is arbitrary). After four complete rounds of hashing forward (encryption) we get 264 states
M5, such that all the 64 bytes sum to zero.
The fact that the Streebog round transformations are bijective allows us to build integrals in
the backward direction (decryption). In Figure 4.3, we present a backward integral for 3.5 rounds of
Streebog internal permutation. Although the third round integral properties are still giving a lot of
information about the integral, i.e.,M2[col 0; 1; ::7] all have grouped 8th order properties, we only get
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Figure 4.2: An example for a forward 4-round 8th order integral for the Streebog permutation. S means
the sum is equal zero
S property integral at states MS1 after applying the inverse linear transformation that processes the
state row by row. Consequently, extending the backward integral to four rounds does not preserve
the S property because the nonlinear substitution transformation does not preserve this property. To
construct the backward distinguisher, we consider 264 input states M4 that have equal values in 56
bytes and differ in only eight bytes. These states differs in the eight bytes in row three such that each
state row M [row 3] takes a value between 0 and 264   1 only once. Following 3.5 rounds of hashing
backward (decryption) we get 264 states, such that all the 64 bytes sum to zero.
In order to cover more rounds, we employ the start from the middle approach. Using this
approach we can combine the forward and backward integrals over more than 7 rounds of the Streebog
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Figure 4.3: An example for a backward 3.5-round 8th order integral for the Streebog permutation. S
means the sum is equal zero
internal permutation. In Figure 4.4, a 15th order integral 7.5-round distinguisher for the Streebog
permutation is given. Moreover, we can obtain an 8th order integral to distinguish 6.5 rounds of the
internal permutation by using 264 middle states only. Such integral is obtained by combining the
forward integral shown in Figure 4.2 with only the two rounds that start with states M4 from the
backward integral shown in Figure 4.3. The 7.5-round integral is constructed by choosing a set of 2120
middle states M4 a structure that have equal values in 49 bytes and differ in 15 bytes. Each middle
state different bytes takes a value between 0 and 2120   1 only once. Finally, hashing forward for 4
rounds and backward for 3.5 rounds we obtain the 7.5-round integral distinguisher for the Streebog
internal permutation. Although both the forward and backward integrals are 8th order integrals, one
47
Figure 4.4: An example for a 7.5-round 15th order integral for the Streebog internal permutation. S
means the sum is equal zero
can perceive the set of 2120 middle states used for the 15th order integral as a set of 256 sets of the
forward 4-round integral and also 256 sets of the backward 3.5-round integral.
Compression Function Distinguishers.
A 7-round 15th distinguisher for the reduced compression function can be obtained after apply-
ing the Miyaguchi-Preneel feedforward and we would still have a fully balanced integral. The com-
pression function distinguisher is shown in Figure 4.5. Additionally, one can construct a compression
function integral distinguisher that covers 6 rounds which are equivalent to half of the compression
function rounds using 264 middle states only (See Figure 4.6). This distinguisher is obtained by com-
bining the forward integral shown in Figure 4.2 with only the two rounds that start with statesM4 from
the backward integral shown in Figure 4.3.
4.4 Extending the Distinguisher to 8 Rounds
In this representation, the internal cipher is viewed as a sequence of six super rounds proceeded
and followed by a transpose operation. Each super round replaces two consecutive regular rounds and
48
Figure 4.5: An example for a 7-round 15th order integral for the Streebog compression function. S
means the sum is equal zero
is composed of two 64-bit transformations:
- A non-linear transformation (SS) which consists of eight 64-bit bijective super Sboxes and op-
erates on the eight rows simultaneously.
- A linear transformation (C) which consists of eight linear transformations applied on the eight
64-bit columns.
In order to demonstrate the new representation of the cipher, we denote the composition of two
transformation A and B by A  B instead of using the classical notation B  A as reading the former
notation from left to right describes the successive transformations that are applied to the input. In
Streebog, a two consecutive rounds are composed of the following transformations:
S  P  L X  S  P  L X;
since P can be applied before or after S, then the two rounds can be written as:
P  (S  L X  S)  P  L X;
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Figure 4.6: An example for a 6-round 8th order integral for the Streebog compression function. S
means the sum is equal zero
where (S  L X  S) represents the super Sbox layer SS that operate on the 64-bit rows. Moreover, if
one observes an r repetitions of the above 2-round representation P  SS  P  L X;, one can view it
as an r repetition of the following shifted pattern:
SS  (P  L X  P )
To this end, one can see that due to the fact that P is a transpose operation which means that it works
on both rows and column, the right composed transformation (P  L X  P ) is a linear mapping that
operates on the individual columns of the input state. Accordingly, our two round representation is
composed of SS = S L X S and C = P L X P , and we only need to add a transpose P operation
before and after the first and last round, respectively. Consequently, the Streebog internal cipher can
be expressed as:
X  P  (SS  C)6  P:
In what follows, we describe how this new representation is used to present an eight round integral
distinguisher of the Streebog compression function.
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Figure 4.7 depicts the proposed eight round distinguisher for the internal cipher. Since SS is a
bijective row mapping and C is a column linear mapping, it can be seen by following the row-wise
transitions of the input sate Z through transformations SS, C, and SS, results in a pattern of an all bal-
anced output. Afterwards, C mixes all balanced columns through an MDS matrix multiplication and
P only transposes the result. Hence, we get an output state with a predictable sum in the forward di-
rection. Similarly, when following the transitions of the input state for the backward direction C 1(Z)
through (SS:C:SS) 1 transitions, we get an all balanced state which also has a predictable sum. Since
the compression function output is given by the Xor addition of the cipher input state and the output
states along with the input chaining value, which is composed of an all constant state, we get a com-
pression function output with a predictable sum. The main idea of this distinguisher using the new
Figure 4.7: An eight round distinguisher for the Streebog internal cipher
representation is that the input state of the forward direction Z and the input state of the backward di-
rection C 1(Z) are linked together through C 1, although, they do not map into each other through C.
Let,X(0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0) or Y(0;0;0;y;0;0;0;0) denote a structure of 264 states, where all the rows have zero value
except the forth row which takes the 264 values of x or y, for x; y 2 f0; 1g64. In this distinguisher, we
use a 2128 chosen middle blocks structure Z = X0  C(Y0), where X0 and Y0 denote X(0;0;0;x;0;0;0;0)
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and Y(0;0;0;y;0;0;0;0), respectively, and X0  C(Y0) denotes the set fX  C(Y ); X 2 X0; Y 2 Y0g.
Accordingly, Z can be partitioned into 264 structures X0  C(0; 0; 0; y; 0; 0; 0; 0; ) = XC(0;0;0;y;0;0;0;0;)
of 264 blocks each, one for each value of the 264 values of y. Accordingly, the proposed eight round
distinguisher requires 2128 middle states and has a time complexity of 2128.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed the integral properties of the compression function and the
internal permutation of the new Russian cryptographic hashing standard GOST R 34.11-2012. As for
the internal permutation, we have proposed two integral distinguishers that cover 4 and 3.5 rounds
in the forward and backward directions, respectively. Moreover, we have shown that using the start
from the middle approach, we are able to combine these two integrals to obtain a 7.5-round and 6.5-
round distinguishers for the internal permutation in the known-key setting that holds with probability
1 and are satisfied by 2120 and 264 middle states, respectively. Furthermore, we extended this approach
based on the integral output properties to the compression function after applying the feedforward
to distinguish 6 and 7 rounds out of 12 rounds with probability 1 and 264 and 2120 middle states,
respectively. Finally, we have shown that by adopting an alternative representation of the Streebog
internal cipher, we can further extend the distinguisher to 8 rounds of the compression function.
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Chapter 5
Preimage Analysis of Streebog
In this chapter, we investigate the preimage resistance of the Streebog hash function. In par-
ticular, we apply a meet in the middle preimage attack on the compression function which allows us
to obtain a 5-round pseudo preimage for a given compression function output with time complexity
of 2448 and memory complexity of 264. Additionally, we adopt a guess and determine approach to
obtain a 6-round chunk separation that balances the available degrees of freedom and the guess size.
The proposed chunk separation allows us to attack 6 out of 12 rounds with time and memory com-
plexities of 2496 and 2112, respectively. Finally, by employing a multicollision attack, we show that
preimages of the 5 and 6-round reduced hash function can be generated with time complexity of 2481
and 2505, respectively. The two preimage attacks have equal memory complexity of 2256. Our results
are summarized in Table 5.1.









Table 5.1: Summary of the preimage cryptanalytic results on Streebog presented in this chapter.
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5.1 Introduction
Following the work of Lai and Massey [94], the meet-in-the-middle (MitM) preimage attack
was proposed by Aoki and Sasaki [20]. The main idea of the proposed technique is to divide the at-
tacked rounds into two independent executions such that each execution is affected by a different set
of inputs. The outputs of the two executions meet at a matching point where a solution is selected
to satisfy both executions. The MitM preimage attack has been applied to MD4 [20, 66], MD5 [20],
HAS-160 [71], and all functions of the SHA family [18, 19, 66]. The attack exploits the fact that
all the previously mentioned functions are ARX-based and operate in the Davis-Mayer (DM) mode,
where the state is initialized by the chaining value and some of the expanded message blocks are
used independently each round. Thus, one can determine which message blocks affect each execution
for the MitM attack. However, several AES-based hash functions operate in the Miyaguchi-Preneel
mode, where the input message is fed to the initial state which undergoes a chain of successive trans-
formations. Consequently, the process of separating independent executions becomes relatively more
complicated.
In FSE 2011, Sasaki proposed the first MitM preimage attack on several AES hashing modes [130].
In the same work, a 5-round pseudo preimage attack on the compression function of Whirlpool was
presented and used for a second preimage attack on the whole hash function. Afterwards, Wu et al.
applied the MitM preimage attack on Grøstl [150] and used a time-memory trade off approach to
improve the time complexity of the 5-round attack on the Whirlpool compression function. Lastly, a
pseudo preimage attack on the 6-round Whirlpool compression function and a memoryless preimage
attack on the reduced hash function were proposed in [132].
In the first part of this chapter, we present a pseudo preimage attack on the compression function
reduced to 5 out of 12 rounds by employing the partial matching and initial structure concepts [130]. In
particular, we present an execution separation for the compression function that balances the degrees
of freedom in both execution directions with their corresponding matching probability [150]. In the
second part of the chapter, we extend the attack by one round using the guess and determine approach
[132], which allows us to guess parts of the state that belongs to one execution. The proposed 6-round
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chunk separation maximizes the overall complexity of the attack by balancing the adopted degrees of
freedom and the guess size. Finally, we show how to generate preimages of the Streebog hash function
using the presented pseudo preimage attacks on the compression function.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview of the MitM
preimage attack and the used approaches is given. Afterwards, in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we provide
detailed description of the attacks and their corresponding complexity. In Section 5.5, we show how
preimages of the hash function are generated using the attacks presented in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Finally, the chapter is summarized and a short discussion is provided in Section 5.6.
5.2 MitM Preimage Attacks on AES-based Hash Functions
The first preimage attack on AES-based hash functions [130] was proposed for the cryptanalysis
of the AES cipher operating in several hashing modes. It is a meet in the middle attack where the
attacked rounds are divided at a given round (starting point) into two independent executions called
the forward and backward chunks. To maintain the independence constraint, each chunk must be
influenced by a different set of inputs. These set of inputs are often called the chunk neutral bytes, e.g.,
if a change in a given byte affects the forward chunk only, then this byte is known as a forward neutral
byte, and consequently, it is a forward degree of freedom as well. Accordingly, the degree of freedom
for each execution direction is the number of independent starting values for each execution. Hence,
the output of the forward and the backward executions can be independently calculated and stored.
Similar to all MitM attacks, the two separated chunks must meet at a common round (matching point)
for matching a solution from both the forward and backward directions that satisfies both executions.
This is accomplished by adopting the cut and splice technique [20] that employs the mode of operation
of the hash functions which chains the input and output states through feedforwarding. More precisely,
this technique regards the first and last states as successive rounds. Subsequently, the whole attacked
rounds behave in a cyclic manner and one can find a common matching point between the forward and
backward executions and one can also select any starting point.
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Improvements to this attack aim to stretch the starting and matching points over more than one round
state and hence extend the number of the overall attacked rounds. Specifically, the initial structure
approach [130] provides the means for the starting point to cover a few successive transformations
where bytes in the states belong to both the forward and backward chunks. Although, neutral bytes
of both chunks are shared within the initial structure, independence of both executions is achieved
in the rounds at the edges of the initial structure. Additionally, the partial matching technique [20]
allows only parts of the state to be matched at the matching point. This method is used to extend the
matching point further and makes use of the fact that round transformations may update only parts
of the state. Thus the remaining unchanged parts can be used for matching. This approach is highly
successful in ARX-based hash functions which are characterized by the slow diffusion of their round
update functions and so some state variables remain independent in one direction while execution is in
the opposite direction. The unaffected parts of the states at each chunk are used for partial matching at
the matching point. However, in AES-based hash functions, full diffusion is achieved after two rounds
and this approach can be used to extend the matching point of two states for a limited number of
transformations. Once a partial match is found, the inputs of both chunks that resulted in the matched
values are selected and used to evaluate the remaining undetermined parts of the state at the matching
point to check for a full state match.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the MitM preimage attack approaches when a hash function operates in the
Miyaguchi-Preneel mode. The red and blue arrows denote the forward and backward executions on
the message state, respectively. In what follows, we apply the techniques discussed in this section to
Figure 5.1: MitM preimage attack techniques for hash functions operating in MP mode.
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derive a 5-round pseudo preimage attack on the Streebog compression function.
5.3 5-round Pseudo Preimage of the Compression Function
For a compression function CF that operates on a chaining value h and a message block m, a
preimage attack is defined as follows: given h and x, where x is the compression function output, find
m such that CF (h;m) = x. However, in a pseudo preimage attack, only x is given and we must find
h and m such that CF (h;m) = x. Generally, pseudo preimages of the compression function of some
narrow pipe constructions are important because they can be turned to preimages of the hash function
with little cost [110]. As for Streebog, the impact of the pseudo preimage attacks on its compres-
sion function is demonstrated in Section 6, where we combine these attacks with 2t multicollision to
produce preimages for the hash function. Pseudo preimage attacks are adopted when the compression
function operates in Davis-Mayer mode where the first state is initialized by the chaining value. Subse-
quently, using the cut and splice technique enforces changes in the first state through the feedforward.
Additionally, the initial phase of MitM preimage attack usually produces pseudo preimages when the
function operates in the Miyaguchi-Preneel mode and the complexity of finding a preimage is higher
than the available bits that can be chosen freely in the message. Consequently, the chaining value is
utilized as a source of randomization to satisfy the number of multiple restarts required by the attack.
As a result, we end up with a pseudo preimage rather than a preimage of the compression function
output.
The attack on the compression function starts by chunk separation. Specifically, we divide five
rounds of Streebog execution into a forward chunk and a backward chunk around a starting point
(initial structure). The adopted chunk separation is shown in Figure 5.2. The forward chunk starts at
M3 and ends atMP4 which is the input state to the matching point. The backward chunk starts atM
P
1
and ends after the feedforward at ML4 which is the output state of the matching point. The red bytes
are the neutral bytes for the forward chunk and after choosing them in the initial structure, all other red
bytes can be independently calculated. White bytes in the forward chunk are the ones whose values
depend on the neutral bytes of the backward chunk which are the blue bytes in the initial structure.
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Figure 5.2: Chunk separation for a 5-round MitM pseudo preimage attack on Streebog compression
function. BSV: Backward starting value, FSV: Forward starting value, MV: Matching value.
Accordingly, their values are undetermined, these bytes cannot be evaluated until a partial match is
found. Same rationale applies to the backward chunk and the blue bytes. Grey bytes are constants
which are either given (compression function output) or chosen (chaining value and constants in the
initial structure).
In the initial structure, we try to balance the degrees of freedom in each direction and the number
of known bytes at the end of each chunk. The degrees of freedom in both directions should produce
candidate pairs at the matching point to satisfy the matching probability. More precisely, to minimize
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the complexity, the total degrees of freedom in both chunks must be greater than the matching size. For
further clarification, we first explain the idea behind the initial structure. The main point is to choose
several bytes as neutral bytes so that the number of output bytes of the L and L 1 transformations at
the start of each chunk that are constant or relatively constant is maximized. A relatively constant byte
is a byte whose value is affected by the degrees of freedom in one execution direction but remains
constant from the opposite execution perspective. The initial structure for the 5-round MitM preimage
attack on the compression function of Streebog is shown in Figure 5.3. We start by randomly choosing
Figure 5.3: Initial structure for the 5-round attack on the Streebog compression function.
the five constant bytes in d[row 0] and then determine the values of blue bytes in c[row 0] so that after
applying L on c[row 0], we maintain the chosen five constants. Since we need five constant bytes in
d[row 0], we only need five free variables in c[row 0] to solve a system of five equations when the other
three bytes are fixed. Accordingly, for any of the first three rows in state c, we can randomly choose
any three blue bytes and compute the remaining five so that the output of L maintains the previously
chosen five constants at d[row 0]. To this end, we have nine free blue bytes (three for each row in
state c). Thus the backward degrees of freedom is 272 which means that we can start the backward
execution by 272 different starting values and hence 272 different output values at the matching point
ML4 . Similarly, we choose 32 constants in state a and for each row in state b we randomly choose
one red byte and compute the other four bytes such that, after the L 1 transformation, we get the
predetermined constants at each row in a. However, the value of the four shaded blue bytes in each
row of state a depends also on the three blue bytes in the rows of state b. We call these bytes relative
constants because their final values cannot be determined until the backward execution starts and these
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values are different for each execution iteration. Specifically, their final values are the predetermined
constants XORed with the corresponding blue bytes multiplied by the L 1 coefficients. In the sequel,
we have eight free bytes (one for each row in b) which means 264 forward degrees of freedom to start
the forward execution and hence 264 different input values to the matching pointMP4 .
At the matching point, we match results atMP4 from the forward chunk with the values atM
L
4 from
the backward chunk through the L transformation. As depicted in Figure 5.2 at the matching point,
five bytes are known from the forward computation and four bytes are known from the backward
computation in each row. As a result, we can form four linear equations using three unknowns and
match the resulting forward and backward values through the remaining equation. More precisely, we
use the following equation to compute a given output row y through the linear transformation L given
an input row x.

x7 x6 x5 x4 x3 x2 x1 x0

2666666666664
l0;7 l0;6 l0;5 l0;4 l0;3 l0;2 l0;1 l0;0
l1;7 l1;6 l1;5 l1;4 l1;3 l1;2 l1;1 l1;0
l2;7 l2;6 l2;5 l2;4 l2;3 l2;2 l2;1 l2;0
l3;7 l3;6 l3;5 l3;4 l3;3 l3;2 l3;1 l3;0
l4;7 l4;6 l4;5 l4;4 l4;3 l4;2 l4;1 l4;0
l5;7 l5;6 l5;5 l5;4 l5;3 l5;2 l5;1 l5;0
l6;7 l6;6 l6;5 l6;4 l6;3 l6;2 l6;1 l6;0




y7 y6 y5 y4 y3 y2 y1 y0

In the above equation, the overline denotes the unknown bytes at a given row. More precisely, the input
contains the unknown bytes x5, x4, and x3 and the corresponding output contains the known bytes y7,
y5, y3, and y1. Accordingly, given the GF (28) equivalent of the Streebog binary matrix [79], we can
form the following equations:
y7 = t
in
7  x5  l2;7  x4  l3;7  x3  l4;7 (5.1)
y5 = t
in
5  x5  l2;5  x4  l3;5  x3  l4;5 (5.2)
y3 = t
in
3  x5  l2;3  x4  l3;3  x3  l4;3 (5.3)
y1 = t
in
1  x5  l2;1  x4  l3;1  x3  l4;1; (5.4)
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where tini is the total of the known input bytes in the i
th row multiplied by their corresponding matrix
coefficients. To this end, we calculate x5, x4, and x3 from equations 1, 2, and 3 and substitute their
values in equation 4. Consequently, the two sides of equation 4 are all known from both input and
output directions. Hence, the matching size per row is one byte and hence the matching probability
for the whole state is 2 64. The choice of the number forward and backward values directly affects the
matching probability as their number determines the number of red and blue bytes at a given row at the
matching point. If the number of blue and red bytes are not properly chosen at the initial structure, one
might have no value to match at the matching point. In other words, we cannot have a MitM matching
value if the total number of red and blue bytes in a given row at the matching point is less than or equal
to eight. The attack can be summarized as follows:
1. Randomly choose the chaining value and the constants at the initial structure.
2. For each forward starting value fwi in the 264 forward starting values atM2, compute the forward
matching value fmi atMP4 and store (fwi; fmi) in a lookup table T .
3. For each backward starting value bwj in the 272 backward starting values in MP2 compute the
backward matching value bmj atML4 and check if there exists an fmi = bmj in T . If found, then
a partial match exists and the full match should be checked using the matched starting points
fwi and bwi. If a full match exists, then output the chaining value and the messageM0, else go
to step 1.
The complexity of the MitM preimage attack is given by 2n(2 r + 2 b + 2 m), where n is the state
size and r, b, andm are the forward, backward, and matching bit sizes, respectively [150]. The choice
of these parameters should minimize the complexity and this can be achieved by keeping r, b and m,
as close as possible. In the chunk separation shown in Figure 5.2, r = 64, b = 72, and m = 64. To
further explain the complexity of the attack, we consider the attack procedure. After step 2, we have
264 forward matching values and we need 264 memory to store them. At the end of step 3, we have
272 backward matching values. Accordingly, we get 264+72 = 2136 partial matching candidate pairs.
Since the probability of a partial match is 2 64, we expect 272 partially matching pairs. The probability
that a partial match results in a full match is 264 512 = 2 448. Consequently, the expected number of
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fully matching pairs is 2 376. Thus we need to repeat the attack 2376 times to get a fully matching pair.
The time complexity for one repetition of the attack is 264 for the forward computation, 272 for the
backward computation, and 272 to check that partially matching pairs fully match. Consequently, the
overall complexity of the attack is 2376(264 + 272 + 272)  2448 time and 264 memory
5.4 Extending the Attack to 6 Rounds
The previous 5-round attack cannot be extended to 6-rounds because at the end of each chunk
execution the state has undetermined bytes at each row. Consequently, applying the linear transforma-
tion L to such state results in a fully undetermined state and no matching can be achieved. A guess
and determine approach [132] can be used in one direction to guess the undetermined bytes in some
rows. Thus we have some known state rows after the linear transformation L. The proposed chunk
separation for the 6-round MitM attack is shown in Figure 5.4. In order to be able extend the attack by
one extra round, we guess the twelve undetermined bytes (yellow bytes) in stateMP4 . As a result, we
can reach stateMP5 with four determined columns where matching takes place.
Our choice of the separation and guessed parameters is based on our analysis of the attack com-
plexity and enumerating several values. Our main objective is to maximize the attack probability by
carefully selecting the forward, backward, and guessed bit values. We aim to maximize the number
of forward bits and keep the backward and the matching number of bits larger than the number of
guessed bits and as close as possible. For our attack, the chosen forward, backward, and guessed bit
sizes are 16, 128, and 96, respectively. Setting these parameters fixes the matching bit size which is
equal to 128. In what follows, we give the attack procedure and complexity based on the above chosen
parameters:
1. Randomly choose the chaining value and the constants the initial structure.
2. For each forward starting value fwi and guessed value gi in the 216 forward starting values and
the 296 guessed values, compute the forward matching value fmi atMP5 and store (fwi; gi; fmi)
in a lookup table T .
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Figure 5.4: Chunk separation for a 6-round MitM pseudo preimage attack on Streebog compression
function. BSV: Backward starting value, FSV: Forward starting value, MV: Matching value
3. For each backward starting value bwj in the 2128 backward starting values, compute the backward
matching value bmj atML5 and check if there exists an fmi = bmj in T . If found, then a partial
match exists and the full match should be checked using the matched forward, guessed, and
backwards values fwi, gi, and bwi. If a full match exists, then output the chaining value and the
messageM0, else go to step 1.
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After step 2, we have 216+96 = 2112 forward matching values which need 2112 memory for the
look up table. At the end of step 3, we have 2128 backward matching values. Accordingly, we get
2112+128 = 2240 partial matching candidate pairs. Since the probability of a partial match is 2 128
and the probability of a correct guess is 2 96, we expect 2240 128 96 = 216 correctly guessed partially
matching pairs. The probability that a partial match is a full match is 2 384. Consequently, the expected
number of fully matching pairs is 2 368 and hence we need to repeat the attack 2368 times to get
a full match. The time complexity for one repetition is 2112 for the forward computation, 2128 for
the backward computation, and 216 to check that partially matching pairs fully match. The overall
complexity of the attack is 2368(2112 + 2128 + 216)  2496 time and 2112 memory.
5.5 Preimage of the Streebog Hash Function
In this section, we show how the previously presented pseudo preimage attacks on the Streebog
compression function can be utilized to produce preimages for the whole hash function. Streebog has
a finalization step which is the last compression function call in the hash function. In this step, the
compression function operates on the modular addition of the previously processed message blocks.
At first glance, this may seem to limit the ability of turning a pseudo preimage of the compression
function to a hash function preimage because inverting the last compression function call returns the
sum of the message blocks and thus constraints their values. However, a preimage of the hash function
can be found when we consider a large set of long messages that produce different sums and a set
pseudo preimage attacks on the last compression function call. Hence, another MitM attack can be
performed on both sets to find the message that corresponds to the retrieved sum [105]. As depicted in
Figure 5.5, the attack is divided into four stages:
1. Given the hash function outputH(M), we produce 2p pseudo preimages for the last compression
function call. The output of this step is 2p pairs of the last chaining value and the message sum
(H515;
P
o). We store these results in a table T .
2. In this stage, we construct a large set of equal length messages such that all of them collide at
H512. This structure is called a multicollision of length 512 [76]. More precisely, a multicollision
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Figure 5.5: Preimage attack on the Streebog hash function.
of length t is a set of 2t messages where each message consists of exactly t block and every
application of the compression function results in the same chaining value. Consequently, all
the 2t messages lead to the same Ht value. Building a multicollision of length t is done with
time complexity of t  2n=2 and memory complexity of t  2 n to store t 2-message blocks, where
n is the state size. In our case, we build 2512 multicollision, i.e.,Mi = m
j
1kmj2k:::kmj512, where
i 2 f1; ::; 2512g and j 2 f1; 2g such that all theM 0is lead to the same H512. To this end, we have
2512 different massages stored in 512  2  512 = 219 memory and hence 2512 candidate sumsP
Mi
.
3. At this point, we try to connect the results of stages 1 and 2 using the freedom of choosing
m513. Specifically, since we are using messages of 513 complete blocks, then both the padding
block mp and the length block jM j are known constants. We also have one known value of
H512 produced from the previous stage. In the sequel, we randomly choosem513, compute H

515
and check if it exists in T . As T contains 2p entries, it is expected to find a match after 2512 p




H514 = gN(H513;mp; N514)
H515 = g0(H514; jM j)
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Once a matching H515 value is found in T, the corresponding
P
o is fixed as well. Hence the






4. At the last stage of the attack, we try to find a message Mi out of the 2512 messages generated
in stage 2 that has a sum equal to the sum
P
Mi
acquired at the previous stage. This can be
achieved by a meet in the middle attack. More precisely, we first calculate all the 2256 sums of







256 and we store them in a table.











 PM2 is in the table. It is expected to find a match after 2256 checks. Once
a match is found, the concatenation of the two message halves that correspond to the matching
sums andm513 is the preimage of the given H(M).
The time complexity of the attack is evaluated as follows: we need 2P (complexity of pseudo
preimage attack) in stage 1, 5122256 to build the multicollision at stage 2, 2512 p evaluations of three
compression function calls at stage 3, and finally 2256 for the MitM attack in stage 4. The memory
complexity for the four stages is as follows: 2p 2-states to store the pseudo preimages in stage 1,
512 2-message blocks for the multicollision, and 2256 for the MitM table in stage 4. Since the time
complexity is highly influenced by p, so we have chosen p = 32 for the 5-round attack and p = 8 for
the 6-round attack to obtain the maximum gain. Accordingly, preimages for 5-round Streebog hash
function can be produced with a time complexity of 232+448+29+256+2512 32 3+ 2256  2481. The
time complexity for the 6-round attack is 28+496+29+256+2512 8 3+2256  2505, both attacks have
a similar memory complexity of 2256 dominated by the MitM attack in stage 4.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have analyzed Streebog and its compression function with respect to preim-
age attacks. We have shown that with a carefully balanced chunk separation, pseudo preimages for
the 5-round reduced compression function are generated with time complexity of 2448 and memory
complexity of 264. Additionally, we have adopted a guess and determine technique to obtain a 6-round
chunk separation that maximizes the forward degrees of freedom and balances the backward and the
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guess bit sizes. As a result, we were able to extend the 5-round attack by one more round with time
complexity of 2496 and memory complexity of 2112. Finally, using 2512 multicollision and another
MitM attack, the compression function pseudo preimage attacks are used to produce 5 and 6-round
hash function preimages with time complexity of 2481 and 2505, respectively. The two preimage at-
tacks have equal memory complexity of 2256. Interestingly, if one considers long preimages (1024
blocks), the time complexity of the attack can be further reduced by removing the last stage MitM
procedure [99]. Specifically, instead of considering 2512 multicollision, one can adopt a variant of the
multicollision attack [58] that deals with the checksum and considers a preimage of the last compres-
sion function call. Accordingly, a 1024 block preimage message for the 6-round reduced Streebog can
be generated in 2496 time and 2112 memory.
It should be noted that the Streebog compression function key whitening round KN enhances its
resistance to certain attacks that require similar diffusion of the executions of both the message and the
chaining value. The guess and determine approach is more effective in reducing the complexity when
similar chunk separation is performed on the key of the internal cipher to provide additional starting
values in both directions [132]. However, key separation cannot be achieved because Streebog has
an initial nonlinear whitening round that deviates the chaining value (key) from the message by one
round. Hence, even if we were able to start from the middle and separate the chaining value execution,




In this chapter, we investigate the new Russian cryptographic hashing standard in the context
of malicious hashing and present a practical collision for a malicious version of the full hash function.
In particular, we apply the rebound attack to find three solutions for three different differential paths
for four rounds. Then, using the freedom of the round constants we connect them to obtain a collision
for the twelve rounds of the compression function. Additionally, and due to the simple processing
of the counter, we bypass the barrier of the checksum finalization step and transfer the compression
function collision to the hash function output with no additional cost. The presented attack has a
practical complexity and is verified by an example. While the results presented in this chapter may not
have a direct impact on the security of the current Streebog hash function, they have raised concerns
within the cryptographic community and presented an urge for the designers of the new standards to
publish the origin of the used parameters and the rational behind their choices. Such concerns were
later addressed by the designers of Streebog in a published paper [129], available on the Russian
standardization agency website, explaining the origin of the adopted parameters.
6.1 Introduction
Research on malicious cryptographic primitives has always been thought of as the work of in-
telligence agencies. The belief that governmental spy agencies work hard to incorporate backdoors
in their primitives, which enables the efficient manipulation of certain security properties, has always
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been lurking in the cryptographic community. This belief was further strengthened last year after
Edward Snowden exposed the existence of the NSA’s Bullrun decryption project [147]. Leaked docu-
ments have shown that the NSA has deliberately inserted a backdoor in the standardized pseudorandom
number generator Dual EC DRBG [148]. This backdoor provides the knowledge of the internal state
of the generator and accordingly its subsequent outputs. Additionally, it is also speculated that NSA
paid RSA Security $10 million in a secret deal to use Dual EC DRBG as the default pseudorandom
number generator in the RSA BSAFE cryptography library [148]. With Dual EC DRBG being rec-
ommended by NIST at that time, these revelations have raised suspicions with respect to the NIST
standards being manipulated by the NSA, particularly, after voices from the cryptographic community
began suggesting the possibility of the NSA compromising the NIST’s recommended elliptic curve
constants [133].
Only few papers have been peer reviewed in public venues in the area of malicious cryptog-
raphy. Young and Yung were among the first to address the topic of malicious cryptography through
their cryptovirology project [151]. Later Rijmen and Preneel proposed malicious versions of CAST
and LOKI by hiding linear relations in the used Sboxes [127]. Work related to malicious ciphers,
implementations and pseudorandom generators includes [22, 27, 54, 119, 120]. Although most of the
previous work focused on ciphers, just recently the concept of malicious hashing have been introduced
in [5,21]. Specifically, Albertini et al. proposed a malicious version of SHA-1 by which collisions can
be produced in an efficient way. They have used the freedom of the round constants to satisfy a given
differential path and generate one block message collisions.
Since coming to effect in 2013, Streebog has been standardized by IETF as RFC 6896 [72].
However, unlike the specifications of other standardized hash functions, the reference of the new
GOST standard [2] gives no information about how or why the parameters of the function (e.g., round
constants, matrix constants, and the number of rounds) have been chosen. This fact opens the door
to our analysis, which makes use of exactly two parameters: the heavily random looking independent
constants and the number of rounds, to present practical collisions for a malicious version of Streebog.
In this chapter, we investigate a malicious version of Streebog. We exploit the randomness
of the independent round constants and take advantage of the number of rounds of the compression
function to efficiently generate collisions for the compression function. More precisely, we first employ
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the rebound attack technique proposed in [93] to find three pairs of messages and keys that satisfy a
specific three 4-round differential paths independently. In the sequel, we use the freedom of five out
of the twelve round constants to connect the three obtained solutions and obtain collisions for the
twelve round compression function. Finally, we tune the last constant of the compression function
to adjust its output after the feedforward to cancel the effect of the counter, Ni 1, addition of the
following compression function call, and append another identical colliding message pair. Hence, we
generate a two block messages 22 multicollision structure where two of them have the same modular
sum and thus a collision at the output of the hash function. While previous work [21] stated that
compression function collisions are not sufficient to generate hash function collision in constructions
that incorporate checksum, our results prove that this is not the case for Streebog. Table 6.1 provides
the six new constants used in our malicious version of Streebog. An example of the two block message
collision along with its corresponding digest is provided in Table 6.3.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a detailed description
of the used approach, the malicious compression function attack and its corresponding complexity.
In Section 6.3, we show how collisions of the malicious hash function are generated using the attack
presented in Section 6.2. Finally, the chapter is concluded and a short discussion is provided in Section
6.4.
6.2 Malicious compression function collision
In Latincrypt 2014, Ko¨lbl and Rechberger presented a practical method to find semi free-start
collision for a 4-round AES-based compression function [93]. More precisely, they have proposed a
way to first find a specific differential path for 1 ri ! 8 ri+1 ! 64 ri+2 ! 8 ri+3 ! 1 transition, then use
the freedom in the key to find two messages that follow the given path. They have implemented their
approach on Streebog and presented a semi free-start collision for the 4-round reduced compression
function. In what follows, we show how we adapt their approach to generate collisions for a malicious
version of the full Streebog compression function.
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Our approach makes use of the heavily random looking independent round constants and the twelve
rounds of the compression function. In fact, the specific number of rounds (12) used in Streebog
enables us to find three independent solutions for the commonly known 1  ! 8  ! 64  ! 8  ! 1
four round differential path and then, by changing five constants, we can successfully connect them
and generate a collision. Our attack starts by finding the first solution which is a pair of messages and
Figure 6.1: The first truncated differential path.
a key that follow the given differential path shown in Figure 6.1. In doing so, we employ the approach
proposed in [93] which is composed of two procedures and is briefly described as follows:
Building the differential characteristic In this procedure, one determines the exact differential
transitions of the above truncated differential trail as follows:
1. Choose a random difference atML4 [3; 3] and propagate it backward until the full active stateM
S
3 .
2. For each byte difference inMS3 , save a set of all possible input differences.
3. Create a table TL of all possible 255 byte difference values d3 (candidates for MP2 [, 3]) and
their corresponding 8 byte difference values L(d3) (candidates for MX3 [row 3]). These values
are the result of applying the linear transformation L to a difference at column 3.
4. For each row ofMX3 , check if there is a possible match with the rows in TL.
5. To achieve the transition from one active byte in MP1 [, 3] to eight active bytes in MX2 [row 3],




According to the Streebog Sbox differential distribution properties, finding the differential character-
istic has a complexity of  220 [93].
6.2.1 Finding a solution for the differential path
Once we have found a characteristic, we now need to find a message pair that follows it. This
can be done by performing the following steps:
1. Set the message state at MX3 with a solution that satisfies the full active state differentials from
the above procedure.
2. UseK3[col 3] to satisfy the solutions of the Sbox differentials atMP2 [col 3]. Also useK3[row 3]
to satisfy the solutions of the Sbox differentials atMX4 [col 3].
Since there is one byte, K3[3, 3], shared between the two solutions, one needs to repeat the above
procedure 28 times. For more details on the specifics of the used technique, the reader is referred
to [93].
6.2.2 Our proposed technique for finding collisions of the malicious compres-
sion function
To this end, we have found a solution to the first differential path with a key input different from
that is produced by the standard IV . This solution gives us a specific input and output differences1in
and 1out at M1[3, 3] and M
L
4 [3, 3], respectively. In the sequel, we restart the above two procedures
to search for the second differential characteristic and its solution such that this second search covers
rounds five to eight and has an input difference 2in at M5[3, 3] equals to the output difference 
1
out
of the first path. Since we restrict the input difference of the second path to a specific value, the
complexity of the second procedure of our search is increased by a factor of 28. However, the overall
search complexity is still dominated by the first procedure which is about 220. Finally, we search
for the third and last differential path and its solution which covers rounds nine to twelve. For this




8 [3, 3] and its
output difference 3out at M
L
12[3, 3] to be equal 
1
in at M1[3, 3], so that the latter cancels out after the
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feedforward. Figure 6.2 depicts an overview of our technique. Similarly colored input and output
differences in the states which result from the three solutions are chosen to be equal. The constants
that are evaluated to connect the three solutions, and to get the desired IV and compression function
output values are also shown in the figure.
Figure 6.2: Our approach for finding collision for the full round compression function.
6.2.3 Connecting the three solutions
Now that we have the three solutions, we can start tuning specific round constants to connect
them. We first work on the first solution’s key output K1, which is different than that generated by
the standard IV . To solve this problem, we fix the new C1 = LPS(IV )  (KX1 ). By doing this,
we guarantee that the resulting new key satisfies the first differential path. Thus, the new colliding
messages arem = (MX1  LPS(IV ) andm0 = m1in.
To connect the first and second solutions, we have to change K5. However, altering K5 affects
both K4 and K6, which are restricted by the solutions of the first and second paths, respectively. In
order to cancel the propagation of alteration to the latter two round keys, we compute the new two




C5 = K5 KX5 ;
C4 = S
 1  P  L 1(K5)K4;




5 are solutions of the second path.
To connect the second and third paths, we perform the same procedure to compute the new C8 and
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C9. Having all the new five constants in place, Table 6.3, gives an example of a colliding message pair
which has the same compression function output using IV = 0 and Ni 1 = 0.
6.3 Collision attack on the full malicious Streebog
While previous work [21] speculated that collisions of the compression function cannot be re-
flected at the output of the hash function when employing a checksum finalization step, in this section,
we show how to turn the previous compression function collision to a hash function collision. On top
of the modular checksum finalization step, Streebog incorporates a counter Ni 1 with each compres-
sion function call. However, Ni 1 is mixed with the chaining value with a simple XOR operation. It
should be noted that once the constants of the compression function are fixed to some values, they re-
main the same for all successive executions of the compression function. Accordingly, it is infeasible
to search for a different collision with the same constants. Our approach replicates the first collision
Figure 6.3: Malicious Streebog collision.
two times, thus creating a 2-block multicollision structure with the same h2 input to the padding call
gN(h2;mp; N2) as depicted in Figure 6.3. By doing this, it is guaranteed that four messages collide at
h2, and only two of them collide at the output of the hash function. Namely, those two that have the
same modular checksum which areM = mjjm0 andM 0 = m0jjm. However, using the same collision
twice implies that the second collision should have a chaining input h1 equal to that of the first colli-
sion which is IV = 0. For this, we compute a new C12 to enforce the output of the first collision h1 to
be 512, which is equal to the value ofN1 used in the following compression function call. The desired
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value of C12 is evaluated as follows:
C12 = S
 1  P  L 1(ML12 M1  512)K12:
To this end, at the input of the second compression function call h1 cancels the effect of N1 and the
second colliding message pair has a chaining input internal state equal to that of the IV which is used
at the first call.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated a malicious version of Streebog. We took advantage of the
heavily random looking constants and the number of rounds of the compression function to present a
2-block message pair with the same digest. Our approach first searches for three solutions for three
different 4-round differential paths, and then uses the freedom of five constants to connect them to
produce a compression function collision. Finally, we employed the freedom in the last constant used
in the round key generation to cancel the effect of the counter used in the second compression function
call. Hence, we were able to append a second similar message pair, thus creating a 22 multicollision
structure where only two of them have the same modular checksum and accordingly the same digest.
It should be noted that these results have no impact on the security of the original standard.
Additionally, this new set of constants does not provide collision for GOST-256 as it uses a different
IV . However, they are interesting in the light of the absence of the source of the used parameters of
the standard. Our results also show one of the first examples of compression function collisions being
sufficient to generate hash function collisions. It is interesting to mention that, due to the versatility
of the used differential path where the one byte difference can virtually be anywhere in the state, we
get the freedom to satisfy the magic number as well as other constraints that are needed to produce
meaningful collisions for some specific file formats (cf. section 4 in [5]). In other words, as the
difference is sparse and the complexity of the attack is upper bounded by 220, if one requires to find
two messages that start with a specific byte value, then we need to repeat the first path search 256
times which raises the time complexity of the attack by a factor of 28. As a future direction, one may
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investigate the applicability of the attack if the number of rounds is not a multiple of four. Also, one
might try searching for a malicious adaptation that holds for the two versions of the hash function
simultaneously. In response to our results, the Russian standardization body TC26 has published a
note [129] explaining the origin of the employed constants.
C1 C4 C5
3b 7b 5d ca f1 e4 23 2f 7b 51 2e eb f5 f6 ab f4 9b b1 e8 b9 00 2f 6d 75
de dd 27 78 d6 9b fe 93 42 52 38 55 1b 14 c2 9d 96 d7 e3 12 a2 5c 66 9c
f7 9f 94 dd 27 02 f3 a2 6e 5b 20 23 c9 b9 8f 3d 7e aa 0e bf dd 0e 04 88
4b 8e ad 06 8d 6f 3a fd a5 cc 0b e3 78 9b 9d 52 f7 30 67 e2 8c b5 37 1e
fa da e2 5c b1 2a 0f 3a bc 30 cc de 99 39 07 69 6b 1c 1b 28 09 6d 0d 78
0f 7d 0d 18 ba f6 0c e9 cb 69 60 cf 89 c9 20 cd 4c fa 57 06 9e da f6 4f
27 b7 42 a3 7d 68 cd 64 e7 e6 7c 81 ef d7 97 6e 1d 20 22 e9 ce 7e 54 3f
5b 41 e8 61 e2 cb 9d a6 71 ac 16 c5 bf cc b9 c1 35 0c 56 b4 d8 a5 01 b7
C8 C9 C12
02 e5 04 18 6c 11 2d 01 f9 53 2e c1 78 84 d2 6e a3 23 32 b5 81 5e 1b 85
02 f1 f2 49 5d d0 aa 7b 17 ae c9 5a a4 44 4c 8d f4 67 4d bc c3 77 fd 7f
98 4c e1 b8 08 fd 0f 60 21 8b 63 a4 c1 2a 32 b8 f8 a1 db b5 e3 69 99 41
46 79 75 f7 37 5d a1 8c 41 2c 9a d0 71 20 55 30 eb 15 09 84 de 8d 22 ea
3c b5 83 ac 90 27 38 30 fb 71 99 26 59 a8 6f 4f 9d e6 44 d5 fd 40 7b 5d
25 af e8 05 d1 bd e3 34 8e 37 7a c5 06 ad 7f 93 d1 32 45 08 e9 3d 3f 51
ea eb 50 bf be 39 32 9a 50 0b be 70 04 4b 9d 5c 2a 36 ae cc 53 97 0f fc
61 1a 1a 22 e1 0d ff 58 d7 aa 2c 27 6e cd 41 01 41 a7 84 f3 44 91 24 3e
Table 6.1: The six new constants.
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C2 C3 C6
6f a3 b5 8a a9 9d 2f 1a f5 74 dc ac 2b ce 2f c7 ae 4f ae ae 1d 3a d3 d9
4f e3 9d 46 0f 70 b5 d7 0a 39 fc 28 6a 3d 84 35 6f a4 c3 3b 7a 30 39 c0
f3 fe ea 72 0a 23 2b 98 06 f1 5e 5f 52 9c 1f 8b 2d 66 c4 f9 51 42 a4 6c
61 d5 5e 0f 16 b5 01 31 f2 ea 75 14 b1 29 7b 7b 18 7f 9a b4 9a f0 8e c6
9a b5 17 6b 12 d6 99 58 d3 e2 0f e4 90 35 9e b1 cf fa a6 b7 1c 9a b7 b4
5c b5 61 c2 db 0a a7 ca c1 c9 3a 37 60 62 db 09 0a f2 1f 66 c2 be c6 b6
55 dd a2 1b d7 cb cd 56 c2 b6 f4 43 86 7a db 31 bf 71 c5 72 36 90 4f 35
e6 79 04 70 21 b1 9b b7 99 1e 96 f5 0a ba 0a b2 fa 68 40 7a 46 64 7d 6e
C7 C10 C11
f4 c7 0e 16 ee aa c5 ec ab be de a6 80 05 6f 52 7b cd 9e d0 ef c8 89 fb
51 ac 86 fe bf 24 09 54 38 2a e5 48 b2 e4 f3 f3 30 02 c6 cd 63 5a fe 94
39 9e c6 c7 e6 bf 87 c9 89 41 e7 1c ff 8a 78 db d8 fa 6b bb eb ab 07 61
d3 47 3e 33 19 7a 93 c9 1f ff e1 8a 1b 33 61 03 20 01 80 21 14 84 66 79
09 92 ab c5 2d 82 2c 37 9f e7 67 02 af 69 33 4b 8a 1d 71 ef ea 48 b9 ca
06 47 69 83 28 4a 05 04 7a 1e 6c 30 3b 76 52 f4 ef ba cd 1d 7d 47 6e 98
35 17 45 4c a2 3c 4a f3 36 98 fa d1 15 3b b6 c3 de a2 59 4a c0 6f d8 5d
88 86 56 4d 3a 14 d4 93 74 b4 c7 fb 98 45 9c ed 6b ca a4 cd 81 f3 2d 1b
Table 6.2: The six unchanged (original) constants.
m m0 m
d2 d7 5d 81 b1 63 d8 cc d2 d7 5d 81 b1 63 d8 cc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
63 16 bb de 0e 61 85 d6 63 16 bb de 0e 61 85 d6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
97 89 a3 e6 55 cf 46 e7 97 89 a3 e6 55 cf 46 e7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
37 de 22 19 54 d6 01 95 37 de 22 bb 54 d6 01 95 00 00 00 a2 00 00 00 00
13 44 b8 4d a3 4d 36 4c 13 44 b8 4d a3 4d 36 4c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
a3 50 36 27 f3 51 7f ee a3 50 36 27 f3 51 7f ee 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
58 23 1d 88 80 1b 09 62 58 23 1d 88 80 1b 09 62 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
08 9d bc 4d aa a1 73 2a 08 9d bc 4d aa a1 73 2a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
H(mjjm0) = H(m0jjm)
94e19a2ad9252ca78d14600c20488ad66de12c72ab3aac19f7bb9e277abe973aea22f1c3fa3be180c6dd212f4b19eefed80fb114c44dfb39ffdb2cfad24c6275
Table 6.3: Example of a 2-block message collision for the malicious Streebog hash function.
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Chapter 7
Differential Fault Analysis of Streebog
In this chapter, we present a fault analysis attack on the Streebog hash function. In particular,
our attack considers the compression function in the secret key setting where both the input chaining
value and the message block are unknown. The adopted fault model is the one in which an attacker
is assumed to be able to cause a bit-flip at a random byte in the internal state of the underlying cipher
of the compression function. We also consider the case where the position of the faulted byte can be
chosen by the attacker. In the sequel, we propose a two-stage approach that recovers the two secret
inputs of the compression function using an average number of faults that varies between 338-1640,
depending on the assumptions of our employed fault model. Moreover, we show that the attack can
be extended to the iterated hash function using a feasible pre-computation stage. Finally, we analyze
Streebog in different MAC settings and demonstrate how our attack can be used to recover the secret
key of HMAC/NMAC-GOST.
7.1 Introduction
Streebog is expected to be included in standardized cryptographic suites that support its use in
the secret key setting. Thus, studying its vulnerability to fault attacks and demonstrating the complex-
ity of the key recovery by an adversary that can manipulate the function’s execution are of paramount
importance. In this chapter, we present a practical differential fault analysis attack (DFA) on Streebog.
The attack considers the compression function when operating with secret inputs which is the default
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setting when the function is used in a message authentication code (MAC) scheme. In other words,
we consider that both the input chaining value and message block are unknown and that we can only
observe the output of the compression function. In the sequel, we propose a two-stage attack using
the one-bit fault model where the attacker is able to cause a bit flip at a chosen or random byte in the
internal state of the function. Employing a specific property of the Streebog Sbox and by observing
several correct and faulty compression function outputs, the first stage of the attack bypasses the final
feedforward and retrieves the state of the internal cipher. Since all inputs are unknown, the retrieved
state does not allow us to invert the internal cipher of the compression function because its round keys
are dependant on the input chaining value which is a secret. Accordingly, in the second stage of the
attack, we recover one of the round keys which enables the recovery of both the chaining value and
message block of the attacked compression function. To this end, we are restricted to the processing of
the last compression function in the iterated hash function as it is the only one which we can observe
both its correct and faulty outputs. For that, we employ two precomputed tables which allows us to
extend the attack to the whole hash function. Finally, we analyze the GOST hash function in different
MAC [25] settings and show how to use our attack to recover the secret MAC key of simple prefix and
secret-IV MACs [124], HMAC, and NMAC [25].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief overview on fault analysis
attacks is given. Afterwards, in section 7.3, we provide a detailed description of the used fault model,
our two-stage approach, and show how to extend the attack from the compression function to the whole
hash function. In section 7.4, we consider Streebog operating in different MAC settings and present
the approaches used in the key recovery of simple prefix, secret-IV, HMAC, and NMAC. Simulation
results and analysis of the number of required faults for different attack scenarios are given in section
7.5. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 7.6.
7.2 Fault Analysis
In mathematical attacks, such as differential and linear cryptanalysis, the attacker tries to ex-
ploit any weakness in the underlying mathematical structure of the cryptographic primitive. In fault
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analysis, which is an implementation dependent attack, the attacker faults the state of the primitive
during its computation to deduce information about its secret material. In particular, the attacker ap-
plies some kind of physical intervention during the computation of the internal state of the primitive
which corrupts random or known bits in the state. Consequently, the attacker observes the correct
and the faulty outputs and performs differential fault analysis [29]. During this analysis, the attacker
gains non negligible information about the secret material embedded in the hardware by comparing
the correct and faulty outputs. Fault injection can be done in many ways which include power glitches,
clock pulses, and laser radiation. The reader is referred to [42,136] for more details about the practical
experimentation with different methods of fault injection.
Fault analysis was first introduced when Boneh et al. showed how the private key of the RSA-
CRT-algorithm can be successfully recovered by observing the correct ciphertext and then injecting a
fault and acquiring the faulty ciphertext [34]. Later on, Biham and Shamir combined fault analysis with
differential cryptanalysis and presented differential fault analysis [29] against DES. Their attack works
by observing the difference between the correct and faulty ciphertexts and exploiting this relation to
recover the key of DES. DFA attacks have been used for the analysis of the hardware security of many
ciphers (e.g., see [23,64,139]). In particular and due to its significance as a standard, AES has received
a lot of attention with regards to DFA where some of the works used fault injection in the encryption
process [64, 139], and others attacked the key schedule [83]. DFA attacks vary in the number of
required faults depending on the employed fault model. Generally, all models assume that the attacker
has access to the physical device, and is able to reset the device to the same unknown initial settings as
often as needed. Furthermore, different assumptions with respect to the amount of control the attacker
has over the position and the Hamming weight of the induced faults are employed.
While most of the DFA work in the literature is targeted towards block and stream ciphers, only
few researchers considered hash functions. This fact might seem logical at first glance because ciphers
have a secret key input. On the other hand, hash functions are usually analyzed with known inputs.
However, lately, DFA attacks have been considered on hash functions with secret inputs, which is
the default setting for the hash function when used in a MAC scheme. In general, adapting DFA
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attacks against hash functions operating in the secret key setting is somewhat inherently more difficult
than adapting it against stream and block ciphers. In fact, unlike block and stream ciphers where one
assumes that only the input key material is unknown, when a hash compression function is used in a
MAC setting, we consider all its inputs as secrets. Additionally, when a hash function is employed in a
MAC scheme, there are usually several applications of the hash function and even a single application
of the hash function uses a domain extender with occasionally a complex finalization stage.
Literature related to DFA attacks on hash functions include the analysis of SHACAL [97],
which is the internal cipher of the SHA1 compression function. Later, the attack was adapted to deal
with the feedforward which masks the output of the internal cipher and both the secret chaining value
and message block were retrieved [70]. Afterwards, DFA was used to analyze HAS1-60 [78], and
Grøstl [55]. In particular, in the analysis of Grøstl [55], the authors have used the one-bit fault model
to invert the truncated output transformation, and to retrieve the input chaining value and message
block of its permutation based compression function. In our attack on Streebog, we employ some of
the concepts introduced in [55]. In the following section, we give the description of our two-stage
attack.
7.3 Differential Fault Analysis Attack on Streebog
Our attack on the Streebog compression function aims to recover the secret input chaining value
and message block. We proceed in a two-stage approach. In the first stage, given the compression
function output, we recover the internal state of the last round of the internal cipher. Unlike the attack
on the permutation based Grøstl, the knowledge of the internal state is not sufficient to recover the
secret inputs since Streebog employs an internal cipher with secret round keys additions. Hence, we
adopt a second stage for the attack where we use the knowledge of the retrieved state from stage one
to successfully recover one of the secret round keys, thus inverting the cipher and acquiring both the
secret inputs of the compression function. In what follows, we give the definition of the used fault
model and one of the Streebog Sbox properties that we are going to use in our attack.
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Fault model: In our attack, we use the one-bit fault model which is used in [55, 64]. For each fault
injection, the attacker is assumed to be able to flip one bit in a given byte of the processed state
whose position at row r and column c may be known or not. The practicality of this model has been
demonstrated in [42], where the authors showed how tuning the laser injection parameters enables
them to control with a 100% success rate the fault injection effect on a single bit: 0 to 1 or 1 to 0. Let
M be a correctly computed state and M 0 a faulty state with a fault induced during its computation,
then M 0 = M   where  is the error state with only one non-zero byte. Formally, the employed
fault model is defined as follows:
[r; c] =
8>><>>:
 2 E for only one byte position;
0 otherwise,
where [r; c] denotes the error at the byte in row r and column c, and the set
E = f0x01; 0x02; 0x04; 0x08; 0x10; 0x20; 0x40; 0x80g:
For the Streebog Sbox, if x is a random input byte, xi 2 E for i = 1; ::; n, n  8 is a randomly
chosen but distinct one bit faults, and
yi = S(x) S(x xi);
then x is uniquely identified by the values of yi only. In other words, the value of the Sbox input byte
x can be recovered by observing n output differences yi corresponding to n one-bit distinct input
faults. According to our exhaustive simulation, depending on x, the average number of fault insertions
xi which affect different bits required to identify x varies between 2:071418 - 4:86861, and the overall
average is n  2:635 faults per byte. For the case when fault insertions xi are randomly picked, the
overall average is n  3:077 faults per byte. Another observation is that, for all x, there always exist




In this stage, we recover the message state of the internal cipher of the compression func-
tion gN(hi 1;m;N). We first observe the value of the correct compression function output hi =
gN(hi 1;m;N). Afterwards and as depicted in Figure 7.1, we induce one-bit fault in a given byte of
M11, which is the input to the last round of the cipher, such that,M 011 = M11, and has only one
non zero byte at position [r; c]. This fault results in a faulty h0i that differs from the correct hi state in
one row as shown in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Fault injection in the first stage of the attack.
For a fault in a given byte positionM11[r; c] we get the following two equations:
hi = (X[k12]  L  P  S(M11)) hi 1 m;
h0i = (X[k12]  L  P  S(M11 )) hi 1 m:
Since, X;L; and P are bijective linear functions, we can propagate the difference at hi backwards
until the state after the Sbox as follows:
hi  h0i = L  P  (S(M11) S(M11 ));
P  L 1(hi  h0i) = S(M11) S(M11 ):
To this end, the difference state at the output of the Sbox of the last round of the internal cipher is
given by out = S(M11)  S(M11  ), where out = P  L 1(hi  h0i) and has only one non-
zero value at row r and column c. Since, the substitution transformation operates on the state bytes
independently, then the knowledge of the difference stateout reveals the position [r; c] of the induced
fault. Accordingly, if we assume that we have enough faulty compression function outputs h0i such
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that we know enough out states for each byte position in state MS11, then using the Sbox property
presented in the previous section, we can recover the value of the entire stateM11.
7.3.2 Stage Two
Although in stage one, we are able to bypass the effect of the feedforward and recover state
M11 of the internal cipher, we are still not able to invert the compression function and retrieve the
secret input chaining value and message block. This is due to the fact that unlike other AES-based
hash functions such as Grøstl which employs an internal permutation where known round constant
additions are used, the Streebog internal cipher employs round key addition. These round keys are
derived from the secret input chaining value and consequently they are not known to the attacker. For
that reason, the knowledge of a round state of the compression function is not sufficient to invert it.
Our strategy in this stage is to recover the value of round key k11, which is the key used in the
round before the last one. Once we retrieve the value of k11, we invert the key schedule to compute
all previous round keys and finally, using the knowledge of the compression function counter N , the
secret input chaining value is recovered. The employed approach depends on the knowledge of state
M11 which we have recovered in the first stage of the attack. To recover the value of k11, we first
retrieve the value of stateM10, then evaluate k11 = L  P  S(M10)M11. Since, we know the value
Figure 7.2: Fault injection in the second stage of the attack.
of M11, we can inject one-bit faults in M10 and propagate the resulting differences in state hi back to
state M11 which is then used as hi in stage one to recover M10. As depicted in Figure 7.2, we inject
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one-faults inM10 and acquire the corresponding faulty h0i which differs from the correct hi in the whole
state. The difference state hih0i is then propagated backward through the linear transformations until
stateMS11. Accordingly, the value of the faulty stateM
0
11 is given by:
M 011 = S
 1(S(M11) (P  L 1(hi  h0i))):
To this end, we get the difference at M11 which is then propagated backward to state MS10. The
difference atMS10 is the output difference of the Sbox at the eleventh round corresponding to the fault
that we injected at stateM10. Consequently, this difference has only one active byte which reveals the
byte position of the injected fault. The difference at stateMS10 is denoted by out and is given by:
out = P  L 1(M11 M 011):
Now, if we repeat stage two such that we get enough out values for each of the 64 positions in
state MS10, we can recover the value of state M10. Consequently, the value of k11 is computed by the
following equation:
k11 = (L  P  S(M10))M11):
In the sequel, using k11 we invert the key schedule and acquire all the round keys. Then by utilizing the
knowledge of the compression function counter N within the hash function, the input chaining value
hi 1 is recovered. Since, we only observe the output of the last compression function call of the hash
function, we always assume that we are processing g0(hi 1;) so thatN = 0. However, the attack can
work on any gN within the hash function as described in the following subsection. Finally, with the
knowledge of the round keys and state M10, we invert the message encryption and recover the input
message blockm of g0(hi 1;).
7.3.3 Extending the Attack to the Hash Function
The two-stage attack presented in the previous section works on a compression function that
one can observe the effect of the induced fault on its output. When Streebog is used in various MAC
applications, full hash function application is used and, as depicted in Figure 7.3, one can only observe
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the output H(M) of the last compression function call g0(ht+1;) of the hash function. Accordingly,
Figure 7.3: The Streebog iterated hash function.
to be able to retrieve the inputs of the previous compression function, we first launch the two-stage
attack on g0(ht+1;). Because we observe both the correct and faulty values ofH(M), we can retrieve
the values of  and ht+1. To attack g0(ht; jM j), the first stage of the attack requires the difference
at ht+1 in addition to its value which cannot be deduced from observing the faulty H 0(M). This
requirement can be fulfilled with a precomputed table T1 for all the possible differences at ht+1 that
result from injecting any fault at all the 64 byte positions of state M11 and their corresponding faulty
H 0(M). Building this table is quite feasible for the fact that whatever the value of the induced fault at
M11, as depicted in Figure 7.1, each byte position atMS11 may have up to 255 difference values which
linearly maps to 255 one row differences ht+1 at state ht+1. Accordingly, for each byte position in
MS11, we linearly propagate the 255 possible differences forward to get ht+1. Using our knowledge
of the values of ht+1 and , we evaluate the faulty H 0(M) corresponding to each difference. Finally,
table T1 will have 64  255 pairs of ht+1 and their corresponding H 0(M). Consequently, table T1
enables us to complete the first stage of our attack because, when we inject a fault in M11, the value
of ht+1 corresponding to the resulting observed faulty H 0(M) is obtained from T1. This step allows
the recovery of the value of stateM11 of g0(ht; jM j).
The second stage of our attack requires the knowledge of the difference M11 at state M11. As
depicted in Figure 7.2, a fault at a given position inM10 may have up to 255 difference after the Sbox
which internally linearly map to 255 one row difference M11 at state M11. Since, we already know
the value of state M11 from the previous step, we can get the corresponding 255 output differences
after the Sbox at stateMS11 and linearly propagate them to get the full active state differencesht+1 at
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state ht+1. Similar to the previous step, we build a second table, T2 with all the 64  255 differences
ht+1 and their correspondingH 0(M). This table allows us to finish stage two of our DFA and recover
the values of ht and jM j of g0(ht; jM j). The knowledge of jM j reveals the number of the processed
message blocks and accordingly the number of compression function calls and their corresponding
counter values. Finally, we repeat the previous two-steps for each compression function and hence
invert all of the compression function calls within the iterated hash function and retrieve all their secret
inputs. Although we consider the 512-bit version of the hash function in our 2-stage attack, it also
works on the 256-bit version where the last four rows of the last compression function are truncated.
We only have to add an initial stage that deals with the truncation. We utilize the fact that the position
and value of a single byte difference in a given row can be uniquely identified from the knowledge of
the difference in any two bytes in the same row after the linear transformation (cf. Lemma 3 in [55]).
In the added initial stage, we retrieve half of the state of the last round. Then, in stage one of our
attack, we recover the whole state in the round before the last one with the knowledge of half of the
difference state after the linear transformation, then continue with the rest of the attack.
7.4 DFA on Streebog in Different MAC Settings
One of the prospective applications of the new Russian standard is using it in MAC schemes.
Despite the fact that both the simple prefix and the secret-IV MACs [124] are vulnerable to length
extension attacks, Streebog is by design not vulnerable to length extension attacks due to its finalization
stage. This property may tempt users to adopt one of the simpler MAC constructions. Indeed, the
designers of the NIST SHA-3 hash function, Keccak [26,39] state on their website that since Keccak is
not vulnerable to length extension attacks, it does not need HMAC and propose that MAC computation
can be done by concatenating the key with the message [80]. Accordingly, in what follows, we consider
Streebog in both the simple and standardized MAC settings, and show how our attack can be used to
recover the secret MAC key.
Simple prefix/Secret-IV MACs: As depicted in Figure 7.4, in the simple prefix MAC, the secret key
is used as the first message block of the processed message in the iterative construction of the hash
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function. More formally, MAC(M) = H(KjjM). On the other hand, in the secret-IV MAC, the
standard initial value is replaced by the secret key in the iterative construction of the hash function.
More formally,MAC(M) = HK(M), whereHK(M) is the keyed hash value of the messageM using
the secret key K as the IV. The knowledge of the authenticated message reveals its corresponding
Figure 7.4: Simple prefix MAC using Streebog.
message blocks and accordingly their modular sum. We can retrieve the secret key of the simple prefix
MAC using the two-stage DFA on the last compression function call. The attack recovers  which
is the modular summation of all processed message blocks including the secret key. Accordingly, to
recover the key, we simply subtract the summation of the known message blocks of the authenticated
message from the retrieved . As for secret-IV MAC, we use our DFA and invert the compression
function calls until the first one with N = 0, the retrived chaining value is the secret key. In both
schemes, if we do not know the authenticate message, we can easily retrieve the number of message
blocks from jM j and iterate the attack backwards until the compression function withN = 0 to recover
the key.
Figure 7.5: HMAC using Streebog.
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HMAC/NMAC: HMAC [25] is defined as:
HMAC(M) = H((K  opad)jjH((K  ipad)jjM));
where opad and ipad are known padding constants andH denotes a hash function call. The algorithm
is standardized by ANSI, IETF, ISO and NIST, and is widely deployed in many Internet security
protocols (e.g. SSL, SSH, IPSec). As depicted in Figure 7.5, the Streebog hash function is called
twice. Our analysis works on the outer hash function call whereK  opad is used as the first message
block. Accordingly, our DFA is applied on the outer hash function and using the observed HMAC(M),
we iterate the attack backwards to invert five compression function calls. The retrieved message block
of the fifth backward compression function reveals the key value after xoring it with opad.
NMAC [25] employs two keys and is defined as:
NMAC(M) = HK2(HK1(M));
where the keys are used as the initial values in the outer and inner hash function calls. The algorithm
has a similar structure to HMAC but differs in that the first compression function call in both hash
function calls in HMAC is omitted, and K1 and K2 are used as the IV for the following compression
function call. Accordingly, if Figure 7.5 is to describe NMAC, we omit gN(IV;K  ipad;N1) and
replace the resulting h1 by K1, and remove gN(IV;K  opad;N1) and use K2 as the IV for the
following compression function call. In the sequel, our attack works first to recover K2 by iterating
the two-stage attack backwards for four compression function calls. Afterwards, the retrieved message
block corresponding to the output of the inner hash function is used to further recover K1 from the
inner hash function application.
7.5 Simulation Results
Since the attack has a very low complexity, we have simulated three scenarios of the attack on
the compression function on an 4-core Intel i7 CPU running at 2.67GHz and the secret inputs were
recovered in less than one minute. The scenarios vary in the assumptions of whether the attacker
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can control the injection of distinct faults and if the faulted byte position can be chosen or not. The
provided average fault requirements are the result of running our simulation using 1000 different inputs
to the compression function. As shown by our simulations, the number of required faults to retrieve
128 bytes in both stages depends on the assumptions used during fault injections. In what follows, we
give the results of our simulation:
1. When the faults are selected distinctly and the byte position [r; c] is chosen by the attacker, then
one needs an average of 338 faults which is equivalent to an average of 2.635 faults per byte.
2. If we randomly induce non distinct one-bit faults and select the byte positions, then the attack
requires an average of 394 fault injections in total with an average of 3.077 faults per byte.
3. In the case where both the byte position and the induced one-bit faults are randomly chosen, the
attack requires an average of 1640 fault injections in total, and accordingly an average 12.807
fault per byte.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the security of the new Russian hash function standard
GOST R 34.11-2012 with respect to differential fault analysis. In particular, we have proposed a two-
stage approach that considers the compression function operating with secret inputs. Using one-bit
faults, the first stage of our attack bypasses the final feedforward and retrieves the internal state of the
cipher used in the compression function. The second stage retrieves one of the round keys used in the
cipher which enables the generation of the rest of the round keys and consequently, the input chaining
value and message block are recovered. We have simulated the attack on the compression function
with different assumptions regarding the control of the attacker over the induced faults and the faulted
position. The results show that our two-stage attack requires between 338 and 1640 faults on average,
depending on what are the assumptions of the employed fault model. Moreover, we have proposed a
feasible precomputation step where we require two tables of size 214 state each to enable the extension
of the attack to the whole hash function. Finally, we have shown how our proposed approach is used
to recover the secret MAC key when Streebog is used in simple prefix, secret-IV, HMAC, and NMAC
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settings. A naive approach to prevent our attack is to use spatial/temporal algorithm level redundancy
and to disable the device output if the two produced MAC tags do not match. Another approach is to
add parity bits to detect corruptions of the inner state registers and disable the device output if any of
these parity checks is violated. Efficient fault analysis resistant implementations for Streebog, as well
as for other hash functions deployed in MAC schemes, need to be addressed in future research.
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Chapter 8
Preimage Analysis of the Maelstrom-0 Hash
Function
Maelstrom-0 is the second member of a family of AES-based hash functions whose designs are
pioneered by Paulo Baretto and Vincent Rijmen. According to its designers, the function is designed
to be an evolutionary lightweight alternative to the ISO standard Whirlpool. In this chapter, we study
the preimage resistance of the Maelstrom-0 hash function which employs the 3CM chaining construc-
tion. More precisely, we apply a meet-in-the-middle preimage attack on the compression function and
combine it with a guess and determine approach which allows us to obtain a 6-round pseudo preim-
age for a given compression function output with time complexity of 2496 and memory complexity of
2112. Then, we propose a four stage attack in which we adopt another meet-in-the-middle attack and
a 2-block multicollision approach to defeat the two additional checksum chains and turn the pseudo
preimage attack on the compression function into a preimage attack on the hash function. Using our
approach, preimages of the 6-round reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function are generated with time com-
plexity of 2505 and memory complexity of 2112.
8.1 Introduction
Maelstrom-0 is an AES-based hash function that adopts a modified chaining scheme called
3CM [53]. The function is proposed by Filho, Barreto, and Rijmen as an evolutionary lighter alterna-
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tive to its predecessor Whirlpool. Maelstrom-0 is considered the second member of a family of hash
functions which is preceded by Whirlpool and followed by Whirlwind. The design of Maelstrom-0
is heavily inspired by Whirlpool but adopts a simpler key schedule and takes into account the recent
development in hash function cryptanalysis. Particularly, the designers consider those attacks where
the cryptanalytic techniques which are applicable on the compression function can be easily mapped
to the hash function due to the simplicity of the Merkle-Damga˚rd construction used by Whirlpool. In
addition to adopting a simpler key schedule which makes Maelstrom-0 more robust and significantly
faster than Whirlpool, the designers employ the Davis-Mayer compression mode which is the only
mode among the twelve secure constructions that naturally allows the compression function to accept
a message block size different from the chaining value size, thus allowing faster hashing rate [53].
Also, all the remaining eleven constructions XOR the message and the chaining value block, thus
forcing either truncation or padding to cope with the different sizes, and it is unclear to what extent
truncation or padding might adversely affect the security analysis.
The most important feature in the design of Maelstrom-0 is the proposal of a new chaining
construction called 3CM which is based on the 3C/3C+ family [61]. This construction computes two
checksums from the generated intermediate chaining values, concatenates them, and as a finalization
step processes the result as a message block in the last compression function call. This finalization step
aims to thwart some generic attacks on the MD construction used in Whirlpool such as long second
preimage and herding attacks, and also inhibits length extension attacks. According to the designers
of Maelstrom-0, the proposed finalization step mitigates the applicability of extending attacks on the
compression function to the hash function. Unfortunately, this is not the case in our attack where we
employ a 4-stage approach that uses a modified technique which defeats the 3CM chaining construc-
tion [56, 57, 59] and combines it with another meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack to extend a pseudo
preimage attack on the compression function to a preimage attack on the hash function.
Literature related to the cryptanalysis of Maelstrom-0 include the analysis of the collision re-
sistance of its compression function by Ko¨lbl and Mendel [92] where the weak properties of the key
schedule were used to produce semi free-start collision for the 6 and 7 round reduced compression
function and semi free-start near collision for the 8 and 10-rounds compression function. An analysis
of the used chaining construction was presented by Gauravaram and Kelsey in [56, 57] along with a
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long second preimage and herding attacks on the hash function. Finally, Mendel et al. used the re-
bound attack to show how employing a message block whose size is double that of the chaining state
is used to present a free start collisison on the 8.5 reduced round compression function [107].
In this chapter, we investigate the security of Maelstrom-0 and its compression function, assessing
their resistance to the MitM preimage attacks. Employing the partial matching and initial structure
concepts [130], we present a pseudo preimage attack on the 6-round reduced compression function. In
the presented attack, we employ a guess and determine approach [132] to guess parts of the state. This
approach helps in maintaining partial state knowledge for an extra round when all state knowledge
is lost due to the wide trail effect. The proposed 6-round execution separation maximizes the overall
probability of the attack by balancing the chosen number of starting values and the guess size. Finally,
we propose a four stage approach which combines a 2-block multicollision attack [56, 57] with a sec-
ond MitM attack to bypass the effect of the 3CM checksum used in the finalization step. Our approach
is successfully used to generate preimages of the 6-round reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function using the
presented pseudo preimage attack on the last compression function. Up to our knowledge, our analysis
is the first to consider the hash function and not only the compression function of Maelstrom-0.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the description of the Maelstrom-
0 hash function along with the notation used throughout the chapter are given. Afterwards, in section
8.3, we provide detailed description of the pseudo preimage attack on the compression function. In
section 8.4, we show how preimages of the hash function are generated using our four stage approach
and the attack presented in section 8.3. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section 8.5.
8.2 Specifications of Maelstrom-0
Maelstrom-0 is an AES-based iterative hash function designed by Filho, Barreto and Rijmen
[53]. Its compression function processes 1024-bit message blocks and a 512-bit chaining value. As
depicted in Figure 8.1, the messageM is padded by 1 followed by zeros to make the length of the last
block 768. Then the remaining 256 bits are used for the binary representation of the message length
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jM j. Hence the padded message has the form M = m1jjm2jj    jjmk, where the last 256-bits of mk
denote jM j. The compression function is iterated in the 3CM chaining mode which is based on 3C/3C+
Figure 8.1: The Maelstrom-0 hash function.
family [61]. Given that hi denotes the internal state value after processing the message block mi, i.e.,
hi = f(mi; hi 1) with h0 = IV , this chaining mode generalizes the Merkle-Damga˚rd construction
by maintaining three chains hi; si; ti instead of only hi. The extra two chains are transformed into an
additional message block mk+1 = skjjtk. The second chain si is a simple XOR accumulation of all
intermediate compression function outputs, recursively defined as s0 = 0, si = hi  si 1. The third
chain is recursively defined as t0 = IV , ti = hi  (ti 1) where an LFSR is employed by  to update
ti 1 by left shifting it by one byte followed by a one byte XOR. More precisely, we compute the hash
value hi in the following way:
h0 = IV;
hi = f(hi 1;mi); for i = 1; 2; :::; k;
H(M) = f(hk; skjjtk):
The compression function, f , employs a block cipher, E and uses the Davis-Mayer mode of operation.
The internal cipher is based on the one used in Whirlpool where it only differs in the key schedule. The
round function which operates on 8 8 byte state is initially loaded with the input chaining value. As
depicted in Figure 8.2, the state is updated through 10 rounds and one key addition at the beginning.
One round of the state update function consists of the application of the following four transformations:
 The nonlinear layer : A transformation that consists of parallel application of a nonlinear Sbox
on each byte using an 8-bit Sbox. The used Sbox is the same as the one used in Whirlpool.
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 The cyclical permutation : This layer cyclically shifts each column of its argument indepen-
dently, so that column j is shifted downwards by j positions, j = 0; 1;    ; 7.
 The linear diffusion layer : AMixRow operation where each row is multiplied by an 88MDS
matrix over F28 . The values of the matrix are chosen such that the branch number of MixRow is
9. Therefore the total number of active bytes at both the input and output is at least 9.
 The key addition : A linear transformation where the state is XORed with a round key state.
Figure 8.2: The Maelstrom-0 compression function.
The key schedule takes as input the 1024-bit message block and generates the 512-bit round keys,
K0; K1;    ; K10. Since the key scheduling process is not relevant to our attack, we do not give a
detailed description of the round key generation function. For more details on the specification of
Maelstrom-0, the reader is referred to [53].
- Notation: Let X be (8  8) byte state denoting the internal state of the function. The following
notation is used in our attacks:
 Xi: The message state at the beginning of round i.
 XUi : The message state after the U transformation at round i, where U 2 f; ; ; g.
 Xi[r, c]: A byte at row r and column c of state Xi.
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 Xi[row r]: Eight bytes located at row r of state Xi.
 Xi[col c]: Eight bytes located at column c of state Xi.
8.3 Pseudo Preimage Attack on the 6-Round Reduced Compres-
sion Function
In our analysis of the compression function, we are forced to adopt a pseudo preimage attack
because the compression function operates in Davis-Mayer mode. Consequently, using the cut and
splice technique causes updates in the first state which is initialized by the chaining value. In our
attack, we start by dividing the two execution chunks around the initial structure. More precisely, we
separate the six attacked rounds into a 3-round forward chunk and a 2-round backward chunk around
the starting round represented by the initial structure. The proposed chunk separation is shown in
Figure 8.3. The number of the forward and backward starting values in the initial structure amounts
for the complexity of the attack. Accordingly, one must try to balance the number starting values for
each chunk and the number of known bytes at the matching point at the end of each chunk. The total
number of starting values in both directions should produce candidate pairs at the matching point to
satisfy the matching probability.
To better explain the idea, we start by demonstrating how the initial structure is constructed.
The main objective of the MitM attack separation is to maximize the number of known bytes at the start
of each execution chunk. This can be achieved by selecting several bytes as neutral so that the number
of corresponding output bytes of the  and  1 transformations at the start of both chunks that are
constant or relatively constant is maximized. A relatively constant byte is a byte whose value depends
on the value of the neutral bytes in one execution direction but remains constant from the opposite
execution perspective. As depicted in Figure 8.4, we want to have six constants in the lowermost row
in state a, then we need to evaluate the possible values of the corresponding red row in state b such
that the values of the selected six constants in state a hold. The values of the lowermost red row in
state b are the possible forward starting values. For the lowermost row in state b, we randomly choose
the six constant bytes in a[row 7] and then evaluate the values of red bytes in b[row 7] so that after
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Figure 8.3: Chunk separation for the 6-round MitM pseudo preimage attack the compression function.
applying  1 on b[row 7], the chosen values of the six constants hold. Since we require six constant
bytes in the lowermost row in state a, we need to maintain six variable bytes in b[row 7] in order to
solve a system of six equations when the other two bytes are fixed. Accordingly, for the last row in
state b, we can randomly choose any two red bytes and compute the remaining six so that the output of
 1 maintains the previously chosen six constant bytes at state a. To this end, the number of forward
starting values is 216. Similarly, we choose 40 constant bytes in state d and for each row in state c
we randomly choose two blue bytes and compute the other five such that after the  transformation
we get the predetermined five constants at each row in d. However, the value of the five shaded red
bytes in each row of state d depends also on the one red byte in the rows of state c. We call these
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bytes relative constants because their final values cannot be determined until the forward execution
starts and these values are different for each forward execution iteration. Specifically, their final values
are the predetermined constants acting as offsets which are XORed with the corresponding red bytes
multiplied by the MDS matrix coefficients. In the sequel, we have two free bytes for each row in c
which means 2128 backward starting values.
Figure 8.4: Initial structure used in the attack on the 6-round compression function.
Following Figure 8.3, due to the wide trail strategy where one unknown byte results in a full
unknown state after two rounds, we lose all state knowledge after applying  on X4 . To maintain
partial state knowledge in the forward direction and reach the matching point at X5 , we adopt a guess
and determine approach [132], by which, we can probabilistically guess the undetermined bytes in
some rows of the state at round 4 before the linear transformation. Thus, we maintain knowledge of
some state rows after the linear transformation  which are used for matching. One have to carefully
choose the number of guessed bytes and both starting values in the initial structure to result in an
acceptable number of correctly guessed matching pairs. Accordingly, we guess the twelve unknown
yellow bytes in state X4 . As a result, we can reach state X

5 with four determined bytes in each row
where matching takes place.
As depicted in Figure 8.3, the forward chunk begins at X2 and ends at X

5 which is the input
state to the matching point. The backward chunk starts at X1 and ends after the feedforward at X

5
which is the output state of the matching point. The red bytes denote the bytes which are affected
by the forward execution only and thus can be independently calculated without the knowledge of the
blue bytes. White words in the forward chunk are the ones whose values depend on the blue bytes of
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the backward chunk. Accordingly, their values are undetermined. Same rationale applies to the blue
bytes of backward execution. Grey bytes are constants which can be either the compression function
output or the chosen constants in the initial structure.
At the matching point, we partially match the available row bytes from the forward execution
at X5 with the corresponding row bytes from the backward execution at X

5 through the linear 
transformation. In each row, we have four and six bytes from the forward and backward executions,
respectively. Since the linear mapping is performed on bytes, we compose four byte linear equations
in two unknown bytes. Then we evaluate the values of the two unknown bytes from two out of the
four equations and substitute their values in the remaining two equations. With probability 2 16 the
two remaining byte equations are satisfied. Hence, the matching probability for one state row is 2 16.
Thus, the partial matching probability for the whole state is 28 16= 128.
For our attack, the chosen number for the forward and backward starting values, and the guessed
values are 216, 2128, and 296, respectively. Setting these parameters fixes the number of matching values
to 2128. The chosen parameters maximize the attack probability as we aim to increase the number of
starting forward values and keep the number of backward and matching values as close as possible
and larger than the number of guessed values. In what follows, we give a description of the attack
procedure and complexity based on the above chosen parameters:
1. Randomly choose the constants in X1 and X

2 and the input message block value.
2. For each forward starting value fwi and guessed value gi in the 216 forward starting values and
the 296 guessed values, compute the forward matching value fmi atX5 and store (fwi; gi; fmi)
in a lookup table T .
3. For each backward starting value bwj in the 2128 backward starting values, we compute the
backward matching value bmj atX5 and check if there exists an fmi = bmj in T . If found, then
a partial match exists and the full match should be checked. If a full match exists, then we output
the chaining value hi 1 and the messagemi, else go to step 1.
The complexity of the attack is evaluated as follows: after step 2, we have 216+96 = 2112 forward
matching values which need 2112 memory for the look up table. At the end of step 3, we have 2128
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backward matching values. Accordingly, we get 2112+128 = 2240 partial matching candidate pairs.
Since the probability of a partial match is 2 128 and the probability of a correct guess is 2 96, we
expect 2240 128 96 = 216 correctly guessed partially matching pairs. To check for a full match, we
want the partially matching starting values to result in the correct values for the 48 unknown bytes in
both X5 and X

5 that make the blue and red words hold. The probability that the latter condition is
satisfied is 248 8 = 2 384. Consequently, the expected number of fully matching pairs is 2 368 and
hence we need to repeat the attack 2368 times to get a full match. The time complexity for one repetition
is 2112 for the forward computation, 2128 for the backward computation, and 216 to check that partially
matching pairs fully match. The overall time complexity of the attack is 2368(2112+2128+216)  2496
and the memory complexity is 2112.
8.4 Preimage of the Maelstrom-0 Hash Function
In this section, we propose a 4-stage approach by which we utilize the previously presented
pseudo preimage attack on the Maelstrom compression function to produce a preimage for the whole
hash function. The designers of Maelstrom-0 proposed the 3CM chaining scheme that computes two
additional checksum chains specifically to inhibit the ability of extending attacks on the compression
function to the hash function. The two additional checksums are computed from a combination of
the XOR of the intermediate chaining values, then the two results are concatenated and processed as
the input message block of the last compression function call in the hash function. At first instance,
this construction seems to limit the scope of our attack to the compression function. Nevertheless,
employing the 4-stage approach, a preimage of the hash function can be found when we consider a
large set of messages that produce different combinations of intermediate chaining values and thus
different checksums and combine it with a set of pseudo preimage attacks on the last compression
function call. Hence, another MitM attack can be performed on both sets to find a message that
correspond to the retrieved checksums. As depicted in Figure 8.5, the attack is divided into four
stages:
1. Given the hash function outputH(M), we produce 2p pseudo preimages for the last compression
function call. The output of this step is 2p pairs of the last chaining value and the two checksums
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Figure 8.5: A 4-stage preimage attack on the Maelstrom-0 hash function.
(h2049; s2049; t2049). We store these results in a table T .
2. In this stage, we construct a set of 2-block messages such that all of them collide at h2048. This
structure is called a 2-block multicollision of length 1024 [57, 76]. More precisely, an n-block
multicollision of length t is a set of 2t messages where each message consists of exactly n  t
blocks and every consecutive n application of the compression function results in the same
chaining value. Consequently, we have 2t different possibilities for the intermediate chaining
values and all the 2t n-block messages lead to the same hnt value. Constructing a 2t n-block
multicollision using exhaustive collision search requires a time complexity of t(2(n 1)+2b=2),
where b is the chaining state size, and a memory complexity of t(2  n) message to store t two
messages of n-block each. In our case, we generate 2-block multicollision of length 1024 which
gives us 21024 2-block message combinations, and each 2-block collision gives us two choices for
the checksum of two consecutive chaining values. In other words, in the first 2-block collision,
we either choose (h1; h2) or (h1; h2) and thus two choices for the checksum chains. To this end,
we have 21024 different 2-block massages stored in 1024  2  2 = 212 memory and hence 21024
candidate chaining checksums.
3. At this stage, we try to connect the resulting chaining value, h2048, from stage 2 to one of 2p
chaining values, h2049, stored in T which was created in stage 1, using the freedom of choosing
m2049. Specifically, we randomly choose 512 bit of m2049, then properly pad it and append the
message length, and using h2048 generated by the multicollision, we compute h2049 and check if
it exists in T . As T contains 2p entries, it is expected to find a match after 2512 p evaluations of
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trieved. Hence the desired checksums at the output of the multicollision, s2048 and t2048 are
equal to s2049  h2049 and  1(t2049  h2049), respectively.
4. At the last stage of the attack, we try to find a message M out of the 21024 2-block messages
generated in stage 2 that results in checksums equal to the ones retrieved in stage 3. For this, we
form a system of 1024 equations in 1024 unknowns to select one combination from the 21024 dif-
ferent combinations of possible chaining checksums which make the retrieved two checksums
hold. Note that, the algorithm proposed in [56] which employs 2512 2-block multicollision and
treats the two checksums independently by solving two independent systems of 512 equations
cannot work on 3CM, as the two checksums are dependent on each other. This algorithm only
works on the 3C chaining construction [57, 59] because it utilizes only one checksum. Accord-
ingly, in our solution, we adopt 1024 2-block messages to find a common solution for the two
checksums simultaneously, hence, having the required freedom to satisfy two bit constraints for
each bit position in the two checksums. The time complexity of this stage is about 10243 = 230.
The time complexity of the attack is evaluated as follows: we need 2p (complexity of pseudo
preimage attack) in stage 1, 1024  2256 + 2048  2266 to build the 2-block multicollision at stage 2,
2512 p evaluations of one compression function call at stage 3, and finally 230 for stage 4. The memory
complexity for the four stages is as follows: 2p 3-states to store the pseudo preimages in stage 1 and
2112 for the pseudo preimage attack, and 212 for the multicollision in stage 2. Since the time complexity
is highly influenced by p, so we have chosen p = 8 to maximize the attack probability. Accordingly,
preimages for the 6-round Maelstrom-0 hash function can be produced with a time complexity of
28+496 + 2266 + 2512 8 + 230  2505. The memory complexity of attack is dominated by the memory
requirements of the pseudo preimage attack on the compression function which is given by 2112.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated Maelstrom-0 and its compression function with respect to
MitM preimage attacks. We have shown that with a carefully balanced chunk separation and the use
of a guess and determine approach, pseudo preimages for the 6-round reduced compression function
can be generated. Moreover, we have analyzed the employed 3CM chaining scheme which is designed
specifically to inhibit the ability of extending attacks on the compression function to the hash func-
tion, and proposed a 4-stage approach to bypass its effect and turn the pseudo preimage attack on the
compression function to a preimage attack on the hash function. Accordingly, 6-round hash function
preimages are generated with a time complexity of 2505 and a memory complexity of 2112.
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Chapter 9
A Meet in the Middle Attack on Kuznyechik
In this chapter, we present a meet-in-the-middle attack on the 5-round reduced Kuznyechik ci-
pher which has been recently chosen to be standardized by the Russian federation. Our attack is based
on the differential enumeration approach, where we propose a distinguisher for the middle rounds and
match a sequence of state differences at its output. However, the application of the exact approach is
not successful on Kuznyechik due to its optimal round diffusion properties. Accordingly, we adopt an
equivalent representation for the last round where we can efficiently filter ciphertext pairs and launch
the attack in the chosen ciphertext setting. We also utilize partial sequence matching which further
reduces the memory and time complexities through relaxing the error probability. The adopted par-
tial sequence matching approach enables successful key recovery by matching parts of the generated
sequence instead of the full sequence matching used in the traditional setting of this attack. For the
5-round reduced cipher, the 256-bit master key is recovered with a time complexity of 2140:3, a memory
complexity of 2153:3, and a data complexity of 2113.
9.1 Introduction
The Russian Federation has recently published a project for a new standard for block cipher
encryption algorithm [3]. A draft for this new algorithm was presented by its designers at CTCrypt
2014 [135]. The new algorithm, Kuznyechik, (Grasshopper in Russian), is chosen [3] to accompany
the current Russian encryption standard GOST 28147-89 [1]. Although the current standard is con-
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sidered a lightweight cipher [122], and only theoretical attacks on the full round cipher have been
presented [51, 74], it operates on 64-bit blocks of data which is not sufficient for the current require-
ments [135]. Hence, the need arose for a new standard with larger block length which is intended to
supersede in the future the current GOST 28147-89 cipher.
The meet-in-the-middle (MitM) attack was first proposed in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman [50]
for the analysis of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Ever since, the attack has been evolving
to cryptanalyze block ciphers such as Present and Prince [38], KTANTAN [33], LBlock [10], and
mCrypton [68]. Additionally, MitM preimage attacks on hash functions have been presented on HAS-
160 [71], Whirlpool [132], Whirlwind [13], and Streebog [12]. The first application of a non standard
type of MitM attacks on AES was due to the work of Demirci and Selc¸uk [47], whose approach opened
the door to a new line of research. They constructed a truncated differential four round distinguisher,
and showed that if the input to the distinguisher has only one active byte that takes all the possible
values, then each output byte can be evaluated as a function of 25 parameters. They also showed that
the values of each output byte corresponding to the input byte values form an ordered sequence that
can be used as a property to identify the right key guess. The main disadvantage of their technique is
the high memory complexity which is required by a precomputation table to store all the sequences
resulting from all the possible combinations of the 25 byte parameters. Accordingly, the approach was
only valid to attack seven and eight rounds of AES-192 and AES-256, and not the 128-bit version.
Afterwards, the number of parameters was reduced to 24 bytes in [48], which lowered the size of the
table by a factor of 8.
Afterwards, Dunkelman et al. proposed the idea of multisets and differential enumeration [52] to
tackle the high memory requirements of the approach of Demirci and Selc¸uk [47]. While the concept
of multisets provides better encoding of the ordered sequence which reduces the size of the table by
a factor of 4, differential enumeration can be considered the main advantage of their attack. More
precisely, differential enumeration allows the ordered sequence to be generated by the knowledge of
16 byte parameters only instead of 24, which brings the number of entries of the table down from 2192
to 2128. This gain is attributed to the use of a low probability truncated differential distinguisher where
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the generated sequences at its output can only take a restricted number of values. Accordingly, one
must initially search through a large amount of input data pairs to find one pair that satisfies the chosen
distinguisher. Indeed, their proposal has reduced the memory complexity of the attack at the expense
of its data complexity required to search for the right input data pair.
Later on, Derbez et al. [49] improved the attack of Dunkelman et al. by borrowing ideas from the
rebound attack [107], and proving that not all of the sequences in the table can be verified by input
data satisfying the truncated distinguisher. They have presented an efficient enumeration technique
and showed that the whole set of sequences can take only 280 values and not 2128 as with the case in
the attack by Dunkelman et al. Accordingly, all the generated sequences require the knowledge of only
10 byte parameters, thus the number of entries of the precomputation table is further reduced to 280.
A direct consequence of their improvement is that the memory complexity is not the bottleneck of the
attack anymore but both the time and data complexities are. Nevertheless, their attack is considered
the most efficient attack on the 7-round reduced AES-128 and 8-round reduced AES-192/256. They
have also used a 5-round distingusher to attack the 9-rounds reduced AES-256.
Finally, Li et al. [96] employed a key-dependent sieve to further reduce the memory complexity
of Derbez’s attack and present an attack on 9 rounds AES-192 using a 5-round truncated differential
distinguisher.
In this chapter, we present a MitM attack on Kuznyechik using the idea of efficient differential
enumeration. Unlike AES, Kuznyechik employs an optimal diffusion transformation applied to the
whole state, where one byte difference results in a full active state with certainty after one round.
Consequently, we construct a three round distinguisher in our attack to recover 16-bytes of the master
key of the reduced 5-round cipher. The direct application of the attack on Kuznyechik requires a time
complexity that exceeds that of the exhaustive search for the 256-bit key, which is also attributed to
the optimal round diffusion. Accordingly, we adopt an equivalent representation of the last round
which allows us to efficiently select ciphertext pairs that satisfy the lower half of the differential path
used in the attack with certainty. Hence, our attack is considered in the chosen ciphertext setting.
This modification lowers the time complexity of the online phase by a factor of 2120 because we
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eliminate the probabilistic propagation of the 16 to 1 transition through the linear transformation from
the ciphertext side. We also present partial sequence matching, by which we generate, store, and
match parts of the ordered sequence while maintaining negligible probability of error. Indeed, not
only we decrease the partially encrypted/decrypted data during online matching and thus the overall
time complexity of the attack is lowered, but this approach also reduces the memory requirements of
the attack.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, the description of the Kuznyechik
block cipher along with the notation used throughout the chapter are provided. Afterwards, in section
9.3, a preliminary security analysis of Kuznyechik against well known attacks is given. In section
9.4, we provide a detailed description of the proposed distinguisher, the adopted attack procedure, our
filtering approach, the proposed partial sequences idea. Finally, the chapter is concluded in section
9.5.
9.2 Specification of Kuznyechik
Kuznyechik [3, 135] is an SPN block cipher that operates on a 128-bit state. The cipher em-
ploys a 256-bit key which is used to generate ten 128-bit round keys. As depicted in Figure 9.1, the
encryption procedure updates the 16-byte state by iterating the round function for nine rounds. The
round function consists of:
 SubBytes (S): A nonlinear byte bijective mapping.
 Linear Transformation (L): An optimal diffusion operation that operates on a 16-byte input and
has a branch number = 17.
 Xor layer (X): Mixes round keys with the encryption state.
Additionally, an initial XOR layer is applied prior to the first round. The full encryption function
where the ciphertext C is evaluated from the plaintext P is given by:
C = (X[K10]  L  S)      (X[K2]  L  S) X[K1](P )
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Figure 9.1: The encryption procedure of Kuznyechik
In our attack, we use an equivalent representation of the last round function. The representation ex-
ploits the fact that both the linear transformation, L, and the Xor operation, X , are linear and thus,
their order can be swapped. One has to first Xor the data with an equivalent round key, then apply the
linear transformation, L, to the result. We evaluate the equivalent round key after the last round r by
EKr+1 = L
 1(Kr+1). We also use the following property of the Sbox:
Property 1. For a given Sbox differential (x; y), the average number of solutions to S(x)S(x
x) = y is 1 over all x.
For further details regarding the employed Sboxes and linear transformation, the reader is referred
to [135].
Key schedule: The ten 128-bit round keys are derived from the 256-bit master key by undergoing
32 rounds of a Feistel structure function. The first two round keys, K1 and K2, are derived directly
from the master key,K, as follows: K1 k K2 = K. As depicted in Figure 9.2, each pair of subsequent
round keys is extracted after eight rounds of execution. During each round, the same round function
used in the encryption procedure is applied to the right half of the input to the Feistel round. However,
round constants are used with the X operation instead of round keys. The 128-bit round constants Ci
are defined as follows: Ci = L(i); i = 1; 2;    ; 32. Let F [C](a; b) denote (L  S X[C](a)  b; a),
where C, a, and b are 128-bit inputs. The rest of the round keys are derived from the first two round
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Figure 9.2: The key schedule of Kuznyechik
keys,K1 andK2, as follows:
(K2i+1; K2i+2) = F [C8(i 1)+8]      F [C8(i 1)+1](K2i 1; K2i), i = 1; 2; 3; 4:
It is interesting to note that Kuznyechik bares a lot of resemblance with one of the AES predecessors,
Khazad [24]. In particular, both ciphers employ an iterative SPN structure for updating the input
block state, where the adopted linear transformation has an optimal diffusion properties. Also, they
both use Fiestel network for the round keys generation. While in Kuznyechik, two round keys are
generated after eight rounds of execution, only one round of execution separates consecutive round
keys in Khazad. They also differ in that Khazad employs involution Sboxes and linear transformation,
and it does not use a linear transformation in the last round.
- Notation: The following notation is used throughout the chapter:
 xi, yi, zi: The 16-byte state after the X , S, L operation, respectively, at round i.
 xji : The state at round i whose position within a set or a sequence is given by j.
 xi[j]: The jth byte of the state xi, where j = 0; 1;    ; 15, and the bytes are indexed from left to
right.
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 xi, xi[j]: The difference at state xi, and byte xi[j], respectively.
 X[Ki]: xor addition of the ith round keyKi.
The memory complexity of our attack is given in 16-byte states and the time complexity is evaluated
in reduced round Kuznyechik encryptions. In the following sections, we give a preliminary security
analysis of Kuznyechik and present the details of our MitM attack.
9.3 Security Analysis of Kuznyechik
The designers of Kuznyechik did not provide any security analysis of the cipher. Accordingly,
we give our analysis of the cipher against some well known attacks.
9.3.1 Differential and Linear Cryptanalysis
Since Kuznyechik employs the same Sbox as the Russian hash function standard Streebog
[135], we use the Sbox properties presented in [79]. The linear transformation of the cipher has an op-
timal branch number of 17. The maximum Sbox differential probability= 8=256 = 2 5. Accordingly,
the maximum probability of a differential characteristic over two rounds is (2 5)17 = 2 85. Also, with
an Sbox nonlinearity of 100, there is no linear approximation over two rounds with an input-output cor-
relation larger than ((128 100)=128)17  2 37:27. Furthermore, letNr denote the minimum number of
differentially or linearly active Sboxes for r rounds, r = 1;    ; 9. Then, using the mixed integer linear
programming approach proposed in [115], one can show that Nr = 1; 17; 18; 34; 35; 51; 52; 68; 69, for
r = 1; 2;    ; 9, respectively. Consequently, given the block length of 128-bits and by noting the data
complexity of differential and linear cryptanalysis, there is no useful differential or linear characteristic
of length more than three rounds.
9.3.2 Related-key Cryptanalysis
This attack exploits either the slow diffusion or the symmetry in the key schedule. The Kuznyechik
key schedule employs a Feistel structure with the same round function used in the encryption rounds.
This round function is designed to cause fast and nonlinear diffusion between round keys. Also, eight
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rounds of processing are used between round keys extraction which makes it infeasible to propagate
and maintain a given relation between keys from two successive extractions.
9.3.3 Integral Cryptanalysis
Using a set of 28 chosen plaintexts which differ in one byte that takes all the 28 values and
the remaining fifteen bytes are equal, results in a zero sum of all 256 cipher states at every byte
position after two rounds. Accordingly, one can recover the third round key by guessing the key
bytes independently, decrypting the corresponding 256 ciphers, and checking for the zero sum at the
respective position. Once the last round key is recovered, one can peal this round off and repeat the
attack to recover the key in the round before the last. The time complexity for recovering the last round
key of the three rounds reduced cipher is 162828  220 and for recovering the whole master key is
221. Extending the attack to four rounds can be done by guessing the last round key and then launching
the previous attack on the first three rounds to recover the third round key which increases the time
complexity to 220+128 = 2148.
9.3.4 Higher Order Differential Cryptanalysis
Since the algebraic degree of the Sbox is 7, then the degree of two consecutive rounds of
the cipher is at most 7  7 = 49 and any 50-th (or higher) order derivative must be 0. One can
append an additional round before these two rounds by choosing 256 plaintext inputs with seven active
Sboxes. The fourth round subkey bytes are then recovered independently with a time complexity of
16 256+8 = 268.
In the following section, we give the details of our MitM attack on Kuznyechik.
9.4 AMitMAttack using Differential Enumeration onKuznyechik
Generally, our attack divides the reduced Kuznyechik block cipher, CK , into three parts, such
that CK = Ck2  Cm  Ck1 , where Cm is the middle part of the cipher which exhibits a distinguishing
property. The employed property is evaluated without the knowledge of the key bits used in these
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middle rounds. Hence, correct round key candidates for k1 and k2 are checked if they verify this
distinguishing property or not. Our middle distinguisher is a truncated differential characteristic such
that, when a set of input states from a -set [44] is presented as its input, the set of each byte of the
output state forms an ordered sequence.
Definition 1. (-set of Kuznyechick) is a set of 256 states where one byte at a particular state takes
all the 28 possible values and the rest of the 15 bytes are constants.
In our MitM attack, we employ a distinguisher where the -set is presented at their input from the
ciphertext side, thus, after partially decrypting it, we acquire the corresponding ordered sequence. We
denote the -set at state xi resulting from changing the byte at position j by sj , j = 0; 1;    ; 15,
where
sj = fx0i ; x1i ;    ; x255i g:
We also denote the set of 255 differences at byte xi r[k] which form the ordered sequence for an r
round distinguisher by osk, k = 0; 1;    ; 15, where
osk = f1xi r[k];2xi r[k];    ;255xi r[k]g;
and lxi r[k] = x0i r[k]  xli r[k], for l = 1; 2;    ; 255. The correct ordered sequence osk is eval-
uated by partially decrypting the 256 bytes which are different in the -set for r rounds. However,
we compute all the possible sequences so that one does not need to know the key bits involved in
this encryption process because we simply compute it using all the possible values of the involved
parameters.
Our proposed 5-round MitM attack employs a three round distinguisher. Figure 9.3 depicts the
differential path used in the attack in which we embed a 1 ! 16 ! 16 ! 1 distinguisher that
starts at x5 and ends at x2. The length of the distinguisher is restricted by the properties of optimal
linear transformation used in the Kuznyechik round. Unlike the MixColumn transformation used in
AES which works on independent columns leading to full state diffusion after two rounds, the linear
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transformation L guaranties full diffusion in one round. As depicted in Figure 9.3, our -set is the set
Figure 9.3: Differential path used in the 5-round attack.
of states resulting from changing the first byte at state x5 and is given by:
s0 = fx05; x15;    ; x2555 g:
The corresponding ordered sequence:
os0 = f1x2[0];2x2[0]; ;255x2[0]g
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is evaluated by the knowledge of the values of 33 bytes. More precisely, in addition to s0, given the
values of 16 bytes at y4, 16 bytes at y3 and 1 byte at y2[0], the ith element, ix2[0] of the ordered
sequence is computed as follows:
 Compute ix5[0] = x05[0] xi5[0] from s0.
 Linearly propagate ix5[0] backwards and compute the value of iy4.
 Using the value of y4 and iy4, pass the substitution layer with certainty and evaluate ix4.
 Linearly propagate ix4 backwards and compute the value of iy3.
 Using the value of y3 and iy3, evaluate ix3
 Linearly propagate ix3 backwards through both X[K3] and L to evaluate iy2[0].
 Using iy2[0] and y2[0], compute ix2[0].
However, by employing the rebound based differential enumeration technique [49], we deduce that
if x05 of s
0 belongs to a pair of messages that follows the differential path in Figure 9.3, then the
corresponding ordered sequence os0 can have only 2152 values. Accordingly, a given ordered sequence
can be computed by the knowledge of 19 byte parameters only. These parameters arex5[0], y4, y2[0],
andy2[0], wherex5[0] andy2[0] denote the differences generated by a conforming message pair.
In what follows, we give the details of the attack steps and explain how we evaluate the 2152 sequences
from these 19 parameters.
9.4.1 Attack Procedure
The attack recovers the 128-bit first round key K1 and one byte of EK6 = L 1(K6). The fact
thatK1 is half the master key,K, enables us to recover the whole master key by exhaustively searching
for the other half. The benefit of the extra knowledge of the recovered byte of EK6 is limited to
making the exhaustive search for the rest of the master key more efficient by early aborting the round
keys generation process if the corresponding byte in EK6[0] does not match the one recovered by our
attack. More precisely, the key schedule employs a large number of rounds between the generation
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of sequential round keys, which leads to a very complex relation between them and renders any key
bridging approaches useless.
The attack is composed of precomputation and online phases. In the precomputation phase, we iter-
ate on all the values of the parameters required for evaluating the ordered sequence, and for each value,
we deduce its corresponding 33 bytes values which are then used to generate the ordered sequence.
We store all the sequences in a hash table. The online phase is further divided into data collection and
filtration, and key recovery phases. In the data collection phase, we collect many pairs such that one
of them satisfies the 5-round differential characteristics given in Figure 9.3. However, given the fact
that our required ciphertext pairs are fully active, we employ an equivalent representation of the last
round to enable efficient filtering by which we are certain that the obtained ciphertext pairs satisfy the
lower two rounds of the differential characteristic. Finally, in the key recovery phase, for each of the
obtained pairs, we compute the ordered sequences by deducing the first round key K1 and guessing
the first byte of EK6. We then search for a match between the online computed sequence and the ones
stored in the precomputed table, which enables the recovery of K1 and EK6[0].
Precomputaion phase: In this phase, we construct a lookup table that contains the 2152 ordered
sequences of the resulting 255 difference,
os0 = f1x2[0];2x2[0];    ;255x2[0]g;
from the s0 = fx05; x15;    ; x2555 g. This stage is done by first iterating on the 2152 possible values for
the 19 bytes x5[0], y4, y2[0], and y2[0], and for each one of them, we deduce the possible values
of the 33 original parameters using the rebound approach. Then, for each of them, we construct the
ordered sequence of 255 differences. The procedure can be summarized as follows:
1. For each of the 2152 possible values of x5[0] k y4 k y2[0] k y2[0], evaluate the values of the
33 bytes required to compute the ordered sequence, which are y2[0], y3, and y4 as follows:
 Linearly propagate x5[0] backwards to evaluate y4.
 Using y4 and y4, evaluate y3.
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 Compute x3 by linearly propagating y2[0] through the linear transformation.
 Find x3, such that S(x3)  S(x3  x3) = y3. According to property 1 in Section 2,
not all the 2152 differentials are possible, but the ones that are possible result in about 216
solutions so we get one solution on average.
 Evaluate y3 = S(x3).
2. The additional knowledge of the evaluated value of y3 provides us with the values of the 33 bytes
required to compute the 255 differences lx2[0], l = 1; 2;    ; 255, of the ordered sequence as
described at the beginning of this section.
3. Store all the generated sequences in a hash table.
Online phase: In this phase, we first find enough pairs of messages such that one of them conforms
to the truncated differential characteristic in Figure 9.3. In this step we introduce a modification to
the default process of data collection [49, 52]. More precisely, instead of collecting enough random
pairs with full active states so that one of them satisfies the two 16 ! 1 transitions through the linear
transformation in rounds 1 and 4, we start data collection from the ciphertext side and employ an
equivalent representation of the last round. During this stage, we commence by composing structures
of the inverse linear transformation of ciphertext that have all the 28 possible values in one byte while
the other bytes are constants. Accordingly, even though their corresponding ciphertext pairs have full
active state, these differences guaranty the 16! 1 transition through the linear transformation. Hence,
we have to repeat this filtration stage enough times so that we satisfy only the probabilistic transition
in round 1. A direct consequence of our modification is that instead of requiring 2240 pairs, the attack
is applicable with 2120 pairs only, thus both the data and time requirements of the attack are lowered by
this difference. The second step uses the found pairs to create a set of sequences and test them against
the precomputed table to identify the correct K1.
Data collection and filtration: In this step, we query the decryption oracle with structures of
chosen ciphertexts to get enough pairs such that one conforms to the whole truncated differential path.
Each structure is composed of 256 ciphertext, where the first byte after applying the inverse linear
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transformation on them takes all the 256 values and the remaining fifteen bytes are equal. The process
is described as follows:
1. To get one ciphertext structure, randomly pick the value of the rightmost fifteen bytes of L 1(C)




215 pairs. This step guaranties that all the corresponding (C;C 0) pairs in the structure conform
to the 16! 1 transition in round 5.
2. Query the decryption oracle for the plaintext pairs (P; P 0) corresponding to the ciphertext pairs
generated in step 1. These pairs are not necessarily going to conform to the 16! 1 transition in
round 1, which happens with probability 2 120.
3. Store the 28 plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts in a hash table.
4. To get one pair of plaintexts (P; P 0) that satisfy the 16 ! 1 probabilistic transition, we need to
try approximately 2120 pairs. Since, each structure provides 215 pairs, one requires about 2105
structures, and hence the above steps are repeated 2105 times.
All in all, we ask for the decryption of 2105  28 = 2113 chosen ciphertexts to get the required 2120
pairs.
Key recovery: The previous steps results in 2120 candidate pairs (Pi; Ci) and (P 0i ; C 0i), for i =
0; 1;    ; 2120   1, with a plaintext difference, Pi = Pi  P 0i , and a predetermined ciphertext dif-
ference, Ci = Ci  C 0i. For each pair, we deduce the possible values of K1 and guess the value of
EK6[0] to compute a candidate ordered sequence and match it against the precomputed table, and thus
determine the value of the right K1. The following process describes the method adopted for the re-
covery of the first round key, and it is repeated for each plaintext pair (Pi; P 0i ) and their corresponding
ciphertext pair (Ci; C 0i).
1. Guess a value for x2[0], and linearly propagate it backwards to get the value of y1.
2. Using the fact that x1 = Pi, find the value of x1 which provides a solution for y1 =
S(x1) S(x1 x1). According to property 1 in section 2, we get one solution on average.
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3. Evaluate K1 = Pi  x1. By repeating the previous two steps for all the possible guesses of
x2[0], we get 28 candidate values for K1.
4. For each candidate of the 28 values ofK1 and for each guess of the 28 guesses of EK6[0], use Ci
to get the rest of the 255 ciphertextsCji for j = 1; 2;    ; 255, corresponding to the s0 generated
by Ci as follows:
 The value of x5[0] which is the first byte of the first state in s0 is evaluated as follows:
x5[0] = S
 1(L 1(Ci)[0] EK6[0]):
 The set of different values of x5[0] in the states of s0 has the following structure:
fx5[0]; x5[0]1; x5[0]2;    ; x5[0]255g;
and j = j for j = 1; 2;    ; 255. Accordingly, we can evaluate the 255 values of
L 1(Cji )[0] corresponding to the values of x5[0]j by
L 1(Cji )[0] = S(x5[0]j) EK6[0]:
 Get the differencejL 1(Ci)[0] = L 1(Cji )[0]L 1(Ci)[0], and propagate it through the
linear transformation to get the corresponding difference jCi. Finally, the required 255
values of Cji are evaluated by C
j
i = Ci jCi.
5. Get the 256 plaintexts (Pi; P 1i ;    ; P 255i ) corresponding to the ciphertexts generated in the pre-
vious step from the currently stored structure.
6. Using K1, partially encrypt the plaintexts (Pi; P 1i ;    ; P 255i ) to get the 256 values of jx2[0],
which form the ordered sequence os0.
7. Check if there is a match between the computed os0 and the 2152 ordered sequences stored in the
precomputed table. If there is a match, then exit with the candidate K1 and EK6[0] as the right
key, else we discard it with certainty.
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The probability of a wrong key producing a valid 255 byte ordered sequence is given by 2152+120+16 2040 =
2 1752, which is negligible and can be relaxed. This fact allows us to present our partial sequence
matching idea.
9.4.2 Complexity Analysis
The memory complexity of the attack is attributed to the precomputed table required for the
storage of 2152 sequences of size 2040 bits each. Thus the memory requirements of the attack is given
by 2152  2040=128  2156 128-bit states. That memory complexity can be reduced by a factor of
4 using the multiset encoding idea (cf. Appendix A in [49]), where 512-bits are used to store the
required information of the 255 bytes in a sequence. The data complexity of the attack is due to
the data collection step where we query the decryption oracle with 2113 chosen ciphertexts. The time
complexity for recovering the first round key is dominated by the time required for partially encrypting
the 256 values in a -set with all the 216 key candidates for all the 2120 collected pairs. Accordingly,
the time complexity of the attack  2(120+16+8)  2=5  2143.
As it is fairly complex to deduce any relation between the recoveredK1 andEK6[0] that can aid
us in the recovery ofK2, which is the second half of the master key, we are left with two options. First,
with the knowledge of the recoveredK1, we can remove one round from the beginning, and repeat the
attack on the following four rounds to recover K2. Otherwise, our second option is to exhaustively
search for K2. Comparing the complexities of both options, we opt for the second one. Thus, the
memory, data, and time complexities required for the recovery of the 256-bit KuznyechiK key are
given by 2154, 2113 and 2143 + 2128  2143, respectively. In what follows, we present the idea of partial
sequence matching by which we reduce both the memory and time complexities of the attack.
9.4.3 Partial sequence matching
Our proposed 5-round attack has a time complexity of 2143, which is affected by the number
of partial encryptions/decryptions required to generate the 28   1 differences in the ordered sequence
from the -set. Accordingly, instead of partially encrypting the 28 values of the -set to get their
corresponding ciphertexts, and then encrypting 28 plaintexts to evaluate the ordered sequence, we can
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reduce the number of encryption/decryption operations to b, where b < 28 and denotes the number of
differences stored in the ordered sequence. In other words, since the probability of error is so small,
it can be relaxed such that we match b bytes of the 28 of the ordered sequence to identify the right
key. More precisely, if we accept the error probability to be 2 32, which is still negligible, the required
number of bytes, b, is evaluated by 2 32 = 2120+16+152 8b. Hence, it is enough to match 40 bytes of the
ordered sequence to identify a right key with an error probability of 2 32. In the sequel, the memory
complexity of the attack is reduced to 2152  (320=128)  2153:3 states, and the time complexity is
evaluated by 2120+16  25:3  2=5  2140:3.
9.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a MitM attack on the new Russian encryption standard, also
known as Kuznyechik, using the idea of efficient differential enumeration. We have proposed an ini-
tial filtration stage which lowers the time complexity of the basic approach by a factor of 2120. Instead
of trying random data pairs such that the truncated differential path is satisfied probabilistically, we
carefully compose ciphertext pairs so that the lower half of the path is conformed to with certainty.
Additionally, we have adopted partial sequence matching, by which we store and match parts of the
ordered sequences while maintaining a negligible probability of error which reduces both the mem-
ory and time complexities of the attack. Our attack on the 5-round reduced cipher has a memory
complexity of 2153:3, a time complexity of 2140:3, and a data complexity of 2113 chosen ciphertext.
It should be noted that several improvements like key bridging techniques [49] for this class of
attacks were possible on AES because of its relatively simple key schedule. This is unlikely to be the
case for Kuznyechik, given the large number of rounds used in the generation of the round keys, which
despite its conceptual simplicity leads to a very complex relation between successive round keys. Also,
we note that 4 rounds of Kuznyechik can be broken using the integral attack (cf. section 5.6 and 5.7
in [24]) which was applied on Khazad.
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Chapter 10
Summary and Future Research Directions
10.1 Summary of contributions
In what follows we briefly summarize the contributions of this thesis in the analysis of the
Russian cryptographic hash function Streebog and block cipher Kuznyechik, and the Maelstrom-0
hash function.
In chapter 3, we have investigated the compression function of the Russian standardized hash
function Streebog and its internal cipher with respect to rebound attacks. First, we analyzed
the differential properties of the Streebog Sbox differential distribution table and showed how
these properties affect the complexity of the rebound attack. As for the internal cipher, we have
introduced differences in both the key schedule and message encryption and proposed a new
message differential path such that a local collision is enforced every two rounds. Accordingly,
the Sbox matching complexity which is caused by its differential bias is bypassed. As a result, a
free-start 5-round collision and 7-round near collision examples for the internal cipher have been
generated. Moreover, the compression function was investigated and we noted that the Streebog
compression function key whitening round, which shifts the flow of the key generation process
from the message encryption by one round enhances its resistance to free-start collision attacks.
However, our results have demonstrated that the Streebog compression function is vulnerable to
semi free-start 7.75 round collision, 8.75 and 9.75 round near collision attacks and an example
for a 4.75 round 50-byte near colliding message pair has been presented.
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In our second analysis of Streebog in chapter 4, we have investigated the structural integral prop-
erties of reduced-round versions of the Streebog compression function and its internal permuta-
tion. Specifically, we presented forward and backward higher order integrals that can be used to
distinguish 4 and 3.5 rounds, respectively. Using the start from the middle approach, we com-
bined the two proposed integrals to get 6.5-round and 7.5-round distinguishers for the internal
permutation and 6-round and 7-round distinguishers for the compression function. Moreover,
following the simplified representation of AES [62], we have extended our original work in [11]
to 8 rounds by considering a new representation of the 12-round Streebog internal cipher. In
this representation, the internal cipher is viewed as a sequence of six super rounds proceeded
and followed by a transpose operation where each super round replaces two consecutive regular
rounds.
In chapter 5, we have analyzed the security of Streebog and its compression function, assess-
ing their resistance to the meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks. Specifically, we presented a
pseudo preimage attack on the compression function reduced to 5 out of 12 rounds by employ-
ing the partial matching and initial structure concepts. In particular, we proposed an execution
separation for the compression function that balances the degrees of freedom in both execution
directions with their corresponding matching probability. Furthermore, we extended the attack
by one round using a guess and determine approach, which allows us to guess parts of the state
that belong to one execution. Finally, using a multicollision attack, the compression function
pseudo preimage attacks were used to produce 5 and 6-round hash function preimages.
Continuing with the rebound attacks, in chapter 6, we proposed a malicious version of Streebog.
By exploiting the randomness of the independent round constants and the number of rounds of
the compression function, we were able to efficiently generate collisions for the compression
function. Specifically, we first employed the rebound attack approach to find three pairs of
messages and keys that satisfy a specific three 4-round differential paths independently. Then
using the freedom of five out of the twelve round constants, we connected the three obtained
solutions to generate collisions for the twelve round compression function. Finally, we tuned the
last constant of the compression function to adjust its output after the feedforward to cancel the
123
effect of the counter addition of the following compression function call, and appended another
identical colliding message pair. Hence, we were able to generate a two block messages 22
multicollision structure where two of them have the same modular sum and thus a collision at
the output of the hash function. While previous works have stated that compression function
collisions are not sufficient to generate hash function collision in constructions that incorporate
a checksum, our results proved that this is not the case with Streebog. Our attack has a practical
complexity and is verified by example.
In chapter 7, we have presented a differential fault analysis attack on Streebog. The attack
considers the compression function when operating with secret inputs which is the default setting
when the function is used in a message authentication code (MAC) scheme. In our analysis, we
have proposed a two-stage attack using the one-bit fault model where the attacker is able to
cause a bit flip at a chosen or random byte in the internal state of the function. Employing a
specific property of the Streebog Sbox and by observing several correct and faulty compression
function outputs, the first stage of the attack bypasses the final feedforward and retrieves the
state of the internal cipher. The second stage of the attack recovers one of the round keys which
enables the recovery of both the chaining value and message block of the attacked compression
function. Lastly, we analyzed the Streebog hash function in different MAC settings and showed
how to use our DFA attack to recover the secret MAC key of simple prefix and secret-IV MACs,
HMAC, and NMAC.
In chapter 8, we have investigated the security of Maelstrom-0 and its compression function, as-
sessing their resistance to the meet-in-the-middle preimage attacks. The Maelstrom-0 hash func-
tion is proposed as a lighter alternative to its predecessor the ISO standard Whirlpool. Firstly, we
have presented a pseudo preimage attack on the 6-round reduced compression function. Then,
we proposed a four stage approach which combines a 2-block multicollision attack [56,57] with
a second meet-in-the-middle attack to bypass the effect of the 3CM checksum used in the final-
ization step, and generate preimages of the 6-round reduced Maelstrom-0 hash function.
In chapter 9, we have presented a meet-in-the-middle attack on the new Russian encryption stan-
dard Kuznyechik using the idea of efficient differential enumeration. Unlike AES, Kuznyechik
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employs an optimal diffusion transformation applied to the whole state, where one byte differ-
ence results in a full active state with certainty after one round. Consequently, we constructed a
three round distinguisher to recover 16-bytes of the master key of the reduced 5-round cipher. In
our analysis, we adopted an equivalent representation of the last round which allows us to effi-
ciently select ciphertext pairs that satisfy the lower half of the differential path used in the attack
with certainty. Hence, our attack is considered in the chosen ciphertext setting. Additionally, we
have presented partial sequence matching, by which we generate, store, and match parts of the
ordered sequence while maintaining negligible probability of error.
10.2 Future work
In what follows, we propose some avenues for possible extension of our work:
With the ongoing CAESAR competition [41] which is scheduled to announce a final portfolio of
authenticated encryption schemes in 2017, it is interesting to investigate how the cryptanalytic
approaches presented in this thesis can be used to analyze the CAESAR submissions. Indeed,
most of the remaining submissions are not fully provably secure. Hence, their security arguments
are completely attributed to their ongoing cryptanalysis. Additionally, the area of integrated
authenticated encryption algorithms is considered relatively new as authenticated ciphers are
less developed than other cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers and hash functions.
The Streebog compression function key whitening round KN creates asymmetry in the key and
message flows which limits our proposed approach of creating multiple local collisions for the
compression function. In our work [7], we maintain a sparse differential path by enforcing
local collisions through keeping similar differential patterns in both the message and key states.
Due to the key whitening round KN , our approach is only successful on the internal cipher.
Accordingly, a possible research direction in the context of the collision analysis of Streebog is
to study the extension of the internal cipher attack to generate collisions of the hash function.
An interesting extension to our malicious adaptation of Streebog is to investigate other malicious
notions such as preimage and second preimage backdoors. To begin, the definitions of preimage
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and second preimage backdoors should be clarified. More precisely, our proposed collision
backdoor is based on having one colliding message block pair that is acquired at the design
stage of the hash function by carefully choosing the constants. Later, this colliding message
pair can be used to generate hash function collisions of various messages by inserting it in these
messages. However, in the context of a preimage backdoor, how can one benefit from designing
the hash function such that the preimage of a specific digest is known? and can one design a
malicious hash function that allows the recovery of the message from its digest with a complexity
lower than the generic attack? Answering these questions remains an open problem and provides
research challenges for future work. From the other perspective, given the fact that we were able
to generate nothing up my sleeve constants in our backdoored Streebog, probing hash functions
for the existence of such backdoors is an interesting topic for research, which is significantly
important especially after the recent Snowden revelations.
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